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ENDURING DESIGN FOR BUSINESS ENTITIES 
 




The success or failure of an institution may hinge on some of the 
earliest decisions of its founders. In constitutional design literature, 
endurance is a widely accepted drafting objective. Indeed, constitutional 
endurance is positively associated with prosperous and stable societies. 
Like drafters of constitutions, business organizers have almost 
innumerable objectives for their enterprises, and attorneys drafting 
organizational documents must take into account these myriad goals. 
Oftentimes the drafting process fails to fully address some of the most 
important of these aims, which results in suboptimal structures that lack 
predictability and reliability. 
This Article looks specifically at small-business organizations and 
argues that drafters can draw from the lessons of constitutional design to 
facilitate a more deliberate drafting process that would result in more 
predictable business institutions. Such a process would accommodate a 
more thorough bargaining process among organizational founders and 
enhance the effectiveness of its governing documents. Certain design 
elements are correlated to constitutional endurance, and those elements 
can guide the drafting process for business associations. Specifically, 
longer-lived constitutions incorporate flexible amendment procedures, 
involve a greater number of constituents in the drafting process and 
enforcement processes, and offer more detail and specificity in the 
governing provisions. Business entities can use some of these same 
features, and this Article offers specific suggestions for incorporating the 
elements associated with endurance into business drafting. By crafting 
organizational structures with elements that parallel those of long-lived 
constitutions, business attorneys can facilitate a more thorough 
bargaining process and craft more usable, resilient documents that 
effectively address unique client objectives. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Current approaches to organizational design and drafting for business entities 
are problematic in a number of important ways, resulting in structures and 
documents that fail to reflect unique client objectives, are disproportionately 
advantageous to particular types of participants, and lack practical functionality. 
Attorneys tasked with forming businesses must address dozens of organizational and 
operational choices—from tax status to voting mechanics to allocation and 
distribution priorities to dissolution procedures—and must draft documents 
consistent with the organizers’ goals.1 In crafting these agreements, business lawyers 
typically work from form contracts or precedent documents from prior similar entity 
formations.2 This reliance on established provisions is almost essential, as the cost 
of creating complex agreements entirely from scratch or even a checklist would be 
both cost prohibitive and needlessly risky.3 Form documents themselves serve as 
checklists of major decision points because in reviewing each contractual section, 
the attorney has to decide whether to retain the standard language or revise it 
according to the specific bargain at hand.4 
Unfortunately, this practice of reliance often leads to complacency, thoughtless 
retention, redundancy, and recondite intricacy in the final product.5 Although it is 
true that many standard contractual provisions do not need to be reworked for each 
operating agreement, when attorneys begin the drafting process by modifying a 
contract designed for a different bargain, too frequently the precedent provisions 
carry unjustified authority.6 
                                                 
1 William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: 
Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1001 (1995) (“Assisting 
clients in forming business associations, a lawyer will focus on various substantive elements: 
the duration of the relationship and the circumstances and terms of termination; the division 
of investment, distributions, gain, and loss; exercise of control, including management 
positions and voting mechanisms; and so forth, depending on the particular project or 
enterprise.”). 
2 See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why 
Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 113 (2000) (“Form contracts are common. Often, 
they are produced by trade associations; parties rely heavily on the form and make minor 
adjustments to suit their circumstances. At other times, a large business uses the same 
contractual form for multiple customers.”). 
3 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Language, Deals, and Standards: The Future of XML 
Contracts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 327–28 (2006) (discussing how costs associated with 
composition and review of contracts can be reduced by replicating terms despite issues of 
“oversimplification or excess complexity” and that “[m]aking changes often entails creating 
numerous internal cross-references in contracts”); Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written 
in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 60–64 (2001) (discussing the economical and 
psychological dynamics of the business contract drafting process). 
4 Hill, supra note 3, at 67 (“The form provides a baseline from which to determine what 
the contract should address.”). 
5 See infra Part II.B. 
6 Hill, supra note 3, at 75 (“The status quo bias favors, not surprisingly, the status quo. 
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Accordingly, organizational documents often contain almost identical features 
regardless of the distinct positions of the individual founders.7 Further, partnership 
and LLC entity agreements typically include needlessly intricate provisions that 
merely state the statutory default rules or are so self-referential or convoluted as to 
require extensive study in order to be meaningful.8 The functionality of these 
provisions is further impaired by the fact that different law firms, and even different 
lawyers within individual firms, use widely divergent language to articulate the same 
concepts.9 
Many of the issues manifested in organizational agreements result from a 
relatively unguided drafting process.10 Aside from perhaps a few anticipated funding 
or performance hurdles they might want addressed, clients largely defer to attorneys 
to provide the decision points and appropriate approaches. As a result, few clients 
are fully informed as to the organizational choices reflected in the document and 
their concomitant rights and obligations.11 
This Article suggests a more focused and intentional drafting process for the 
design of business entities and the drafting of organizational documents, specifically 
through the lens of endurance. Although stakeholders in a newly formed entity often 
have widely divergent expectations with respect to the length of their investment 
and commitment, endurance should be a guiding objective for business drafters in 
many situations. Drawing from institutional design research, this Article suggests 
certain design elements that can facilitate longer-lived organizational documents.12 
Even if a long-lived institution is not the primary goal of the founders, incorporating 
the design elements associated with enduring constitutions can facilitate intentional 
drafting that results in more predictable and usable documents for the business. 
In constitutional design literature, endurance (i.e., longevity) is a widely 
accepted objective for drafters of constitutions.13 Indeed, longer-lived constitutions 
                                                 
The form—the way things have been done in the past—counts as the status quo for this 
purpose; the bias is towards retaining the status quo rather than changing it.”). 
7 See infra Part II.B. 
8 For example, many pass-through entities contain labyrinthine partnership tax 
provisions, which ultimately defer to the Treasury Regulation’s requirements for 
maintenance of capital accounts. Cf. Terence Floyd Cuff, Drafting Real Estate Partnership 
and Entity Agreements, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 12, available at 
http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol28No11/2215.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XLV3-
ZJE4 (“Partnership agreements too often suffer from the arrogance, complacency, 
incompetence, false economy, and inattention to detail of drafters.”). 
9 See Hill, supra note 3, at 59 n.2. (“In my experience, some law firms have aspired to, 
but never quite achieved, the goal of having a firm-wide form. It’s not as though the forms 
used within a firm, or for that matter, by different firms, differ enormously in content; they 
do, however, look quite a bit different. The provisions might be phrased differently or be in 
a different order.”). 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
11 See infra Part II.B. 
12 See infra Part V. 
13 See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 10 
(2009) (“Written constitutions are central institutions in the political order and powerful 
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are associated with highly desirable economic, social, and political outcomes.14 This 
Article first explores whether institutional endurance should similarly be a goal of 
organizers of business entities. It concludes that, although businesses differ in key 
(and obvious) respects from nation states, constitutional design literature can inform 
the methods employed by business drafters. A drafting approach that mirrors the 
constitutional bargains that produce longer-lived documents can alleviate some of 
the current shortcomings of business institutional design.15 Benefits accrue even if 
the goal of the founders is not an enduring organizational structure because 
approaching institutional design from an endurance perspective requires drafters to 
be thoughtful and thorough in creating a document that meets the needs of the 
clients. 
This Article continues with a discussion of how the objective of endurance 
should promote thoughtful drafting. The constitutional design literature posits that 
certain design elements are correlated to constitutional endurance.16 Specifically, 
longer-lived constitutions typically have a flexible amendment procedure, involve a 
greater number of individuals in the drafting process and enforcement, and offer 
more detail and specificity in the governing provisions.17 Business organizational 
documents can utilize some of these same features, and this Article offers specific 
suggestions for incorporating these elements into business drafting. 
For example, flexibility of amendment procedures can translate into the 
business context.18 Constitutions that are easily amended last longer because they 
can adapt to changing conditions that deviate from the expectations of the 
constituents.19 Similarly, when a business needs an unexpected infusion of capital, 
market competitors change their positions, or members unexpectedly depart, the 
entity needs the ability to adapt to the change. The flexibility to address these issues 
can be incorporated in a variety of ways, one of which is the amendability of the 
structure of the bargain itself. Flexibility to adapt to changing conditions can also be 
addressed via transfer restrictions and other provisions that reflect the relative 
commitment of the individual investors to the bargain.20 
  
                                                 
symbols of statehood. As a normative matter, most designers and scholars seem to assume 
that they should endure.”). 
14 Recent empirical research has shown that constitutional endurance is positively 
associated with societies that have higher per capita GDP, are more democratic, and are more 
politically stable. See id. at 30–32. 
15 See infra Part IV.A. 
16 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78; see also Ran Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” 
and Constitutional “Success,” 87 TEX. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2009) (“[Constitutional design 
literature] suggests that desirable social and political outcomes may be accomplished through 
optimal institutional planning and implementation.”). 
17 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 207–08; see infra Part IV.B. 
18 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
19 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78, 99–103. 
20 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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Second, the benefits of inclusion described in the constitutional literature also 
inure in the business organizational context.21 Founders with a real voice in the 
drafting process are more invested in the performance and endurance of the 
organization.22 Transparency and inclusion also give the structure legitimacy that an 
obscured drafting process can undermine.23 
The final feature shown to correlate with constitutional longevity is 
specificity.24 Specificity in this context refers to the number of issues addressed and 
the detail with which they are addressed.25 The same reasons that support complexity 
for constitutional bargainers bolster that design element in the business setting.26 
Parties who have invested the time and resources to deliberately address more of the 
issues that are likely to arise during the operation of the entity are likely to have 
more faith in the functioning of the entity.27 Further, the steeper upfront costs make 
participants less eager to withdraw from the business.28 
Part II of this Article sets forth some of the problems prevalent in the current 
approach to drafting organizational documents as well as the suboptimal business 
documents developed through this process. Part III details the analogy between 
                                                 
21 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
22 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 80 (noting that after investing resources in political 
institutions and seeing a return on that investment, stakeholders develop an increased 
“familiarity with and attachment to the founding document”). 
23 Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2008) (“The normative justifications 
are rooted in participatory democratic theory, emphasizing the importance of broad 
participation and deliberation for the creation of a legitimate governance system.”); see also 
Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 201, 206 (2009) (“Higher levels of participation are presumed to function like 
supermajority rules, restricting the adoption of undesirable institutions and protecting 
prospective minorities in the democratic processes that are established. Participation thus 
legitimates and constrains, substituting inclusive processes for consent to make effective 
government possible.”); Hirschl, supra note 16, at 1339 (“In democratic settings, the 
purported normative goal of such design may be the enhancement of the political system’s 
democratic credentials (e.g., participation and representation), the increase of accountability 
and transparency, and the balancing of the principles of majority rule with the idea that 
democracy may have more to it than mere adherence to those principles. At the more 
practical level, such design may aim at enhancing the quality and effectiveness of public 
policy making and, by extension, supporting political, cultural, and economic development 
in a given polity.”). 
24 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
25 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 84 (“Specificity refers to the level of detail in 
the constitution and the scope of topics that the document covers.”); infra Part IV.B.3. 
26 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
27 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 87 (noting that parties to an extensive and 
detailed bargain will seek “to ensure that it is up to date and reflects current political 
realities”); infra Part IV.B.3. 
28 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 87 (“The greater the investment in a particular 
constitutional bargain, the less willing parties will be to deviate from it by switching to a new 
bargain.”); infra Part IV.B.3. 
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constitutional design and business organizational drafting. Part IV describes the role 
of endurance in the constitutional setting and applies the elements associated with 
long-lived constitutions to the business organizations context. Part V suggests how 
various components of organizational drafting derived from constitutional design 
can inform an attorney’s approach to document formulation and incorporate 
objectives of endurance in a way that mitigates certain shortcomings of the current 
approach and results in better, more predictable structures. 
 
II.  PERSISTENT SHORTCOMINGS IN PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICE 
 
To support the suggestion that business lawyers should seek alternative 
guideposts for crafting organizational and transactional documents, this section 
describes an unsettling pattern in such practices—that oftentimes attorneys draft 
neither thoughtfully nor deliberately29—and it discusses the impact those practices 
have on various parties. Largely, the planning process and resulting contractual 
products are deeply flawed and fail to ascertain and reflect the objectives of diverse 
business clients.30 Although much of the literature exploring the current defective 
state of practice focuses on the transactional setting (e.g., asset purchase 
agreements),31 the same issues are prevalent in organizational planning and drafting, 
which, like other transactional work, is predominantly a contract-crafting practice.32 
The focus of this Article is primarily on organizational document design and 
drafting, but the same principles would be largely applicable to most other aspects 
of transactional practice. 
 
A.  Perfunctory Drafting Process 
 
Heavy reliance on precedent and form documents generated by law firms, trade 
groups, bar association committees, and others is a reality of modern practice.33 That 
reliance reflects the need for attorneys to accommodate short timelines for 
increasingly complex transactions and to keep costs palatable for clients.34 There is 
                                                 
29 Hill, supra note 3, at 61 (focusing on “an overlapping but distinct phenomenon: the 
persistence of redundancy and the ubiquity of cumbersome, inartful, and sometimes 
imprecise drafting.”); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 
85 (2011) (“Underlying boilerplate contracts—and underlying the automobile assembly 
line—is what might be called the efficiency of unthinking mimicry.”). 
30 See generally Preston M. Torbert, The Crisis Exposed by Pari Passu, 40 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 87, 88 (2011) (arguing that “the legal profession needs to seriously upgrade its attention 
to contract drafting”). 
31 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 3, at 59–62 (complex business contracts); Torbert, supra 
note 30, at 87–89 (business contracts generally). 
32 “An LLC’s operating agreement is a contract among its members . . . .” See Daniel 
S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 116 (2006). 
33 See Eggleston et al., supra note 2, at 113–14. 
34 Cunningham, supra note 3, at 315 (2006) (identifying the utility of precedent 
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simply not enough time to draft complex agreements from scratch, nor would that 
be an efficient way to practice.35 Although reliance on precedent documents has the 
benefit of harnessing wisdom accumulated over a number of years,36 extreme and 
dogmatic adherence to their terms is seldom optimal.37 
Attorneys commonly begin the drafting process by locating a precedent 
document from a similar transaction in the law firm database and trying to cast the 
current transaction into the mold of a previous deal.38 For simpler or more standard 
arrangements, attorneys may rely on form documents that either leave blank various 
provisions that should be customized for the particular deal or include alternative 
standard clauses from which the attorney can select to best suit the present bargain. 
Once a template has been used successfully (or at least without known 
problems), subsequent drafters have little motivation to move away from what 
worked in a prior situation. Indeed, the risks of using an untested form may not be 
difficult to justify.39 For an attorney with limited experience, explaining such 
deviation is all the more daunting.40 
                                                 
agreements for lawyers needing “to meet the time-sensitive demands of intricate drafting and 
rigorous interpretation.”). 
35 Id. (describing the “tight time pressure” under which corporate lawyers draft 
agreements). 
36 See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 33 (2013); see also 
Hill, supra note 3, at 59 (“[L]awyers have come up with a production process by which each 
lawyer can access the accumulated wisdom of many: the ‘form.’”). 
37 See Andrea J. Boyack, Sovereign Debt and The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: 
What Sticky Boilerplate Reveals About Contract Law and Practice, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 
23 (2013) (book review) (“While commoditization may, to some extent, be a welcome cost-
saver, mindless boilerplate churning is a distressing development for lawyers as well as 
clients.” (citation omitted)); Cunningham, supra note 3, at 315 (“While useful, [form 
documents] are only partial solutions for meeting the corporate lawyer’s burden.”). 
38 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 327–28 (“Traditionally, corporate lawyers prepare 
contracts using precedent forms that address comparable transactions. Special needs 
typically are met by adding deal-conforming provisions from other precedent contracts. Even 
when lawyers concoct new language for deal-specific circumstances, they invariably do so 
with reference to extant forms.”); Richman, supra note 29, at 79 (“[C]onstructing a contract 
rarely begins with the principal—the client—articulating his or her contractual needs; rather, 
it beings with the accumulated knowledge that the law firm has amassed from its past 
production experience.”). 
39 Boyack, supra note 37, at 12–13 (“ . . . theory [for why certain clauses remain in 
contracts] holds that standardized contract terms represent the highest evolution of a given 
type of contract, containing great collective wisdom and time-tested terms. In theory, during 
the development of these terms, latent ambiguities and defects are weeded out through a 
process of rejection and refinement, resulting in a near-perfect, and wholly understood 
written contract form.” (citation omitted)). 
40 See William E. Foster & Emily Grant, Memorializing the Meal: An Analogical 
Exercise for Transactional Drafting, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 403, 407 (2014) (“Recent 
graduates, having just spent three years in law school and a summer studying intricate bar 
exam hypotheticals, are daunted by the myriad issues implicated in each provision they draft. 
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So often, however, in contemporary practice, documents lack context.41 
Transactional and organizational documents are no longer housed exclusively in 
binders on the shelves with a complete company history and the transactional closing 
book, but instead in the digital ether of the law firm servers.42 An attorney can find, 
with a few search terms, dozens of sample agreements, but the context of those 
transactions is lost.43 Even assuming that the document an attorney finds was 
appropriate for the specific transaction it was negotiated for, it may not be 
appropriate for present drafting needs.44 Even more so, that precedent document 
itself may have been the product of heavy reliance on previously drafted 
agreements.45 So a drafter with a precedent contract from the server’s stockpile can 
be multiple steps removed from the purpose and origins of that document, which 
affects the weight that should be afforded that document as a guide.46 
In addition to the lost context of electronic document templates, rigid adherence 
to unfamiliar forms risks unintentional retention and compromises effective 
agency.47 Clients may be delighted in part by the use of well-worn precedents in that 
they simplify the negotiation process and make it less expensive.48 Attorneys using 
                                                 
As a result, they get anxious about their drafting responsibilities.” (citation omitted)). 
41 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 327–29 (discussing how precedent documents are 
generally organized in a “linear rather than modular” format, “appear[ing] as full-length 
contracts read page-by-page, not clustered by clause type.”). 
42 Id. at 315 (“Increasingly, lawyers create and preserve these agreements in electronic 
forms that enable word searching.”). 
43 Id. at 327–29. 
44 See Joshua Stein, How to Prevent Mistakes in Transactional Legal Work, PRAC. 
LAW., Sept. 1994, at 51, 53–54 (“[W]orking from ‘the documents we used in the last deal’ 
can create problems. This is especially likely when the current transaction involves different 
parties, different property, and a different business deal. Using the same documents as used 
in an earlier transaction may burden you with every concession, negotiated omission, and 
deal-specific variation from the first transaction, in addition to whatever new inconsistencies 
and imperfections the drafting and negotiating process for the new transaction might 
create.”). 
45 For example, empirical studies of definitions of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles in corporate contracts “suggest[] that the most fruitful explanations for differences 
in [such provisions] are path dependence and the habits of traditional form practice that 
corporate lawyers follow. . . . [V]ariation between contract types most likely is a function of 
what formulation was used in earliest versions of particular contract types.” Cunningham, 
supra note 3, at 327. 
46 Id. (“[S]tylistic path dependence also arises within particular law firms, whose 
original choice of a given expression of a term can continue despite it being either too simple 
or unnecessarily complex.”). 
47 See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 38–39. 
48 See Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition 
and Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 342–43 (2010) (positing that 
contract standardization is desirable because it lessens transaction costs and provides a 
contract “whose meaning and interpretation is more certain.”); Boyack, supra note 37, at 21 
(“Clients also push contract commoditization by demanding cheaper, faster legal solutions 
to their business goals.”). 
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forms can complete a transaction in a compressed timeframe and can avoid accruing 
hours of seemingly excessive billing time.49 Moreover, standardized forms represent 
the successful prior experiences of similarly situated parties.50 
Reverential dependence on such forms may not, however, reflect the unique 
circumstances of clients. If standard forms are so pared down in terms of content 
and flexibility, clients may question the value of involving attorneys in the 
transaction at all.51 Alternatively, documents that address every possible 
contingency in complex detail may be even less useful to a client whose 
organizational structure and operations are relatively simple.52 In both run-of-the-
mill and highly customized transactions, clients also remain frustrated by lengthy 
negotiations and by the ultimate contractual product produced from various 
approaches to form-based practice.53 
Explanations for why the business drafting process is problematic and for the 
rampant overreliance on precedent documents are numerous.54 First, law firms and 
attorneys lack incentives to undertake the costly and time-consuming process of 
drafting innovative and unique documents for every transaction.55 The expense of 
                                                 
49 See Kevin E. Davis, Contracts As Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 90 (2013) 
(“[T]he costs of creating a contractual document also have to be considered.”); Patterson, 
supra note 48, at 327 (“Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial 
relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs.”). 
50 Eggleston et al., supra note 2, at 112 (“The form contract is attractive because it 
reflects the accumulated wisdom of parties who have used the contract in the past.”); 
Patterson, supra note 48, at 343. 
51 See Boyack, supra note 37, at 23 (“Contracting commoditization not only dissociates 
transactional practice from the creative and analytic skills prized by generations of lawyers 
and honed in our law schools, but as a practical matter renders lawyers less valuable and less 
necessary to contracting.”). 
52 See Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory 
of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 191 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Modularity 
in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1213–14 (2006). 
53 Cunningham, supra note 3, at 315 (“Despite [the use of forms to streamline the 
drafting process], clients often complain that corporate contracting is too protracted and 
evidence shows that resulting contract terms sometimes are oversimplified or excessively 
complex. Both problems increase transaction costs associated with these important 
exchanges.”). 
54 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 33–43. 
55 Id. at 163 (“[D]espite the many caveats, there remains evidence that the institutional 
structure of the modern large law firm impedes innovation in contract design.”); Davis, supra 
note 49, at 88 (“[L]aw firms have limited incentives to generate innovative contracts for use 
by others.”). 
964 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
locating56 or creating57 alternative provisions, as well as the cost of assembling and 
editing unfamiliar language,58 may steer attorneys toward the ease and safety of 
extant documents.  
The benefits generated by such innovation flow to others outside the firm.59 The 
costs involved in generating and refining transactional and organizational 
documents are borne exclusively by the drafting firm, but the benefits of the 
innovation flow easily and uncontrollably outside of the firm. Transactional lawyers 
frequently exchange documents in electronic formats that are easily duplicated, 
making it exceptionally difficult for attorneys to retain control over the 
dissemination and replication of their work product. This situation is described as a 
collective action problem where an individual in a group—for example, one attorney 
among all drafting attorneys—bears the cost of an action that benefits the other 
members of the group, who act as free riders.60 Because of the high costs of 
innovative drafting with benefits running to unknown parties, “[l]aw firms 
discourage contract evolution, push transactional volume and conformity, and 
penalize innovation.”61 
In addition to avoiding the expenditure of cost and time to deviate from 
precedents, the use of preexisting documents provides a level of comfort to the 
drafter, the client, the organization, and the industry as a whole.62 Attorneys by their 
                                                 
56 “[S]earch costs to find superior alternatives may be high and prevent locating them . 
. . .” Cunningham, supra note 3, at 327. In the same sense that it is difficult to divine the 
motivations for the terms that are contained in the prior contract, it is also expensive to find 
or create new provisions. Id. at 328. “Locating suitable precedent documents can be 
expensive and involve numerous steps. Search costs are reduced by repositories of precedent 
documents, including Westlaw, LEXIS, the SEC’s EDGAR system, and University of 
Missouri’s new Contracting and Organization Research Institute (CORI).” Id. Despite this 
ever-increasing access to quality form documents, it is difficult to justify these costs when 
the end result may be only marginally better than extant forms. Cf. id. at 328–29 (describing 
the steps required to tailor precedent documents to a specific transaction). 
57 “[S]witching costs may be high to identify alternative ways to capture accumulated 
wisdom in contract terms . . . .” Id. at 327. In other words, a single precedent document 
contains a great deal of information about prior transactions, both successful and 
unsuccessful, and other sources of this information are less obvious. Id. 
58 Id. at 327–28 (discussing how costs associated with composition and review of 
contracts can be reduced by replicating terms despite issues of “oversimplification or excess 
complexity” and that “[m]aking changes often entails creating numerous internal cross-
references in contracts”); see also Boyack, supra note 37, at 14 (“Furthermore, once changes 
are proposed to one part of a form, it opens up the entire document to re-negotiation, which 
undercuts one of the great utilities of form use to begin with, namely ease of contracting.”). 
59 Davis, supra note 49, at 105 (explaining that, although the social benefit of innovative 
documents may be high due to the low cost to others to copy that work, the producers of 
innovative documents have “sub-optimal incentives to invest in [such] innovation” because 
they typically do not share in the benefits derived by those copiers). 
60 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 40–41. 
61 Boyack, supra note 37, at 17. 
62 Patterson, supra note 48, at 343 (“[A] contract that is more commonly used is more 
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nature are generally risk averse, both on behalf of their clients and for themselves, 
and contract drafting is no exception.63 Drafters develop a comfort level in using 
terms that have been used over time, with the added benefit of reducing the risk of 
erroneous interpretation.64 In the same sense, a deviation from customary provisions 
more blatantly leaves lawyers exposed to criticism and to the questioning of their 
judgment.65 
Transactional documents—particularly organizational documents—govern 
real institutions, and modification of the document has an impact in how the 
organization may be run or how certain things are accounted for in an individual 
transaction.66 Additionally, from an industry-wide standpoint, drafters recognize 
                                                 
commonly interpreted by courts, and therefore is a contract whose meaning and 
interpretation is more certain. To the extent that a user values this certainty, as most do, the 
contract is therefore more valuable even for users who are not familiar with its terms.” 
(citations omitted)). 
63 Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding 
Contracts: A Contract Lawyer’s View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 
189, 235–36 (1995). Bernstein explains that 
 
[c]ontract lawyers often resist the assumption of risk for any number of reasons 
other than the best interest of the clients. They may fear losing the client if a 
remote contingency occurs more than they fear transaction breakdown that can be 
attributed to opposing counsel, they may not know the client’s circumstances, or 
they may simply be inexperienced. In any event, it is important to recognize 
agency problems since it is the decisionmaker’s risk aversion that controls 
contracting decisions. 
 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Hill, supra note 3, at 67 (noting that most lawyers “will defer 
too much” to form documents). 
64 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 34. Learning externalities speaks to the drafter’s 
own efficiency in using the same document and the same terms. Id. 
65 Id. at 39–40; cf. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited 
Liability: An Empirical Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 111 (“[T]he 
choice of organizational form is a complicated matter, dependant [sic] on a variety of factors, 
including the behavior of other similarly situated firms that the decision makers consider 
competitors for prestige and clients.”); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence 
in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 356 (1996) (“In many situations, . . . judgments regarding the lawyer’s 
ability will be less harsh if the contract term that led to the bad outcome was one that many 
other lawyers had employed in similar circumstances.”); Bruce M. Price, A Butterfly Flaps 
Its Wings in Menlo Park: An Organizational Analysis of Increases in Associate Salaries, 
2005 WIS. L. REV. 713, 743 (discussing law firms’ tendency to raise compensation in order 
to keep pace with competitors and maintain the appearance of professional legitimacy). 
66 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 38–39; see also D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. 
King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009) (“[C]ontracts, through years 
of experience and adapting, become routine solutions to common problems faced by 
organizations.”). For example, a modification of a loan-to-value formula in a lending 
agreement could alter the requirements for how a borrower reports to its lender in a way that 
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benefits associated with using the same form, structure, and language as other 
lawyers.67 When terms are prevalent among a large number of users, unique terms 
become more idiosyncratic, and the slight benefits of modifying the language to 
more accurately reflect the deal may be outweighed by the burden of leaving the 
security associated using the existing form language.68 
Apart from practical cost and comfort considerations, another explanation for 
the strict reliance on form or precedent documents is grounded in the status quo bias 
that parties and drafting attorneys have with respect to preexisting language.69 
Additionally, “anchoring effects may bias them to rely too much upon inherited 
terms contained in those forms.”70 In other words, the terms contained in preexisting 
documents carry more influence than they would absent their inclusion, for whatever 
reason, in the precedent document.71 People also tend to place a higher value on 
retaining what they already have than they would otherwise ascribe to the same 
thing.72 In the drafting context, modifying structure or language involves both 
adopting something new and giving something up, and there is the potential for the 
sense of loss or risk associated with that deviation.73 
                                                 
is unduly burdensome to the borrower, the lender, or both. 
67 The market uniformity theory “posits that there is value to having identical 
contractual products in a market, and that standard terms persist because the value of 
uniformity outweighs the cost of coordinating a move to new contractual language among 
all users.” Boyack, supra note 37, at 13. 
68 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 34–35; see also Joshua Stein, Cures for the 
(Sometimes) Needless Complexity of Real Estate Documents, REAL EST. REV., Fall 1995, at 
63, 66, available at http://www.joshuastein.com/infoFrame.php?pdf=26, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9ZLG-ALZE (“The unease about the growing complexity of transactions 
rarely translates into specific steps to simplify them. Because transactions have always been 
negotiated and closed this way, individual participants in particular transactions hesitate to 
do anything differently. They accept these cumbersome processes because they assume the 
other side is playing the same game.”).  
69 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 608, 625 (1998) (“[S]tatus quo bias[] is that people systematically favor maintaining 
a state of affairs that they perceive as being the status quo rather than switching to an 
alternative state, all else being equal.”); see also Kahan & Klausner, supra note 65, at 361–
62 (discussing the effects of status quo bias as it relates to standard corporate contract terms). 
70 Cunningham, supra note 3, at 327. “‘Anchoring’ refers to the ability of initial 
‘reference points’ to influence judgments. Once initial reference points, or ‘anchors,’ are 
established, adjustments to these initial anchors tend to be too small. Anchoring thus biases 
final judgments in the direction of the anchor.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 65, at 362. 
71 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 65, at 363 (“Standard terms carry an aura of stability 
and objectivity . . . . Although the presence of learning and network externalities may provide 
a rational reason for a firm to adopt a standard term, the possibility of anchoring bias suggests 
that a decision to adopt such a term may not be wholly rational or value-enhancing.”). 
72 This is known as the endowment effect. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 41–
42 (citing Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, 
in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)). 
73 See Korobkin, supra note 69, at 655–56 (arguing that contracting parties may be 
significantly more concerned with losing rights rather than gaining others and this 
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Finally, departures from form or precedent documents can be an inadvertent, 
often negative, signal to other parties or attorneys about the goals and intentions of 
the drafter and the drafter’s client.74 Requesting a change in boilerplate language or 
in a frequently used industry term can raise concerns about the trustworthiness and 
commitment of a party75 or may unnecessarily characterize the client’s position as 
unique or troublesome.76 Attorneys may also be reluctant to change something 
because changing the term in future documents makes it seem like the past 
documents meant something else (i.e., that the revision was a subsequent remedial 
measure).77 A simple modification of a boilerplate term, perhaps even intended to 
clarify the writing, may erroneously signal that the previously used term meant 
something different.78 
                                                 
phenomenon may better explain adherence to the status quo in contract drafting). 
74 See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2006) (“[I]n the presence of a familiar and commonly utilized 
background provision . . . a transactor might fear that proposing an opt-out from th[is] default 
will dissuade his potential counterparty from entering into the agreement. The fear is that the 
counterparty will suspect that the proposer’s decision to deviate from the norm and use an 
unfamiliar provision hides some unknown problem: in short, that it is a ‘trick.’”); Boyack, 
supra note 37, at 14 (discussing the theory that “making any change to form language signals 
a novel risk to the counterparty and/or will invite costly additional negotiation.”). 
75 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 35–37; see also Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra 
note 74, at 652–53 (describing how transactors and counterparties may react to proposed 
modifications of boilerplate forms). 
76 See George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 
279, 311 (2009) (“The effects of novel terms are hard to predict; business people feel more 
comfortable with customary terms. They also prefer to rely on trust and cooperation rather 
than on contract terms. Proposing novel or complex terms may signal that a party intends to 
‘rely on his legal rights’ in case of a dispute rather than trying to resolve it amicably.” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 70 (1993)).  
77 “Boilerplate that has repeatedly been construed by courts will take on a set, common 
meaning, but one that may not be easily understood by reading the language itself.” Michelle 
E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (2006); see also GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 36, at 37. 
78 See Boyack, supra note 37, at 14 (discussing this concept as “hindsight bias theory”). 
For example, a party may want to add the following anti-assignment provision to a contract: 
 
Neither this Agreement, nor any of the rights, obligations and duties hereunder, 
may be assigned by either party without the prior written consent of the other 
party. 
 
Inclusion of this anti-assignment provision in a contract that previously had none might 
signal that the prior contracts were intended to be assignable. More specifically, the language 
could be revised in a later document to say that the agreement may not “be assigned or 
otherwise transferred by either party.” The addition of “or otherwise transferred” in a 
subsequent document may not have been intended by the party to be a departure of its 
understanding of the effect of the previous agreements that lacked such language. 
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Ultimately, these theories seek to explain the difficulty for attorneys to stray 
even slightly from boilerplate contract language and precedent structures. However 
the motivations that give rise to current practice are labeled, collectively, they 
describe an environment in which it is challenging or risky to be innovative. At the 
end of the day, attorneys are frazzled in practice and it requires a great deal of effort 
to reinvent the wheel. Particularly for junior lawyers, there is security in documents 
that are tried and true. Simply stated, on some level, attorneys are seemingly 
incapable or unwilling to spend the time to change their documents or routines. 
Acknowledging that reality is helpful in evaluating when and whether to suggest 
changes to prevailing drafting processes. 
 
B.  Prêt-à-Porter Agreements 
 
Overreliance on form or precedent documents is problematic for the drafting 
attorney, the client, the unsophisticated and underrepresented investors, and thus 
ultimately the business as a whole. First, sheer form practice is less fulfilling from a 
professional standpoint for lawyers themselves.79 From a business reputation 
perspective, overreliance on forms cheapens the skill and services that lawyers 
provide and in turn creates dissatisfaction among clients, who expect attorneys to be 
more than scriveners.80 Instead, lawyers should be “creative, flexible, dynamic 
problem solvers,”81 adding unique value to the document for the client.82 
Second, organizational documents laced with carryover language from a prior 
agreement may not reflect the true intentions of the parties to the current 
transaction.83 Documents that are not thoughtfully created or at least modified for 
the unique transaction at hand can expose a client to risks of liability, a failed 
business deal, or loss of capital or goodwill.84 At the very least, those documents 
could fail to reflect any customization for the client or include any specifics about 
the particular business.85 Cut-and-paste documents are also not user-friendly; they 
                                                 
79 Id. at 23 (noting that “transactional practice focused on producing assembly-line 
contracts is far less fulfilling for the practitioner.”). 
80 Id. at 1–2 (“Clients complain that the benefit received from their transactional counsel 
do not justify the cost, particularly when lawyers revert to the role of mere scrivener and 
mindlessly rely on contractual boilerplate.”). 
81 Id. at 22. 
82 Id. (“In today’s tighter and more cynical legal market, it is vital that lawyers at every 
level add sufficient value to a transaction to justify their salary and employ. Transactional 
legal practice must focus on adding true value as an ex ante advocate, and that involves 
contract research and design, not just mechanical contract production.” (citation omitted)). 
83 Id. at 21. 
84 Id. (“The divorce of intent from contract boilerplate causes a divorce of reality from 
the law and unjustifiably creates or perpetuates avoidable client risks.”). 
85 See Bernstein, supra note 63, at 232 (“The substance of standardized provisions and 
default rules of law, like store-bought clothes, often do not fit the situation precisely and may 
not maximize the value of the transaction to the parties.”). 
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are often laced with jargon, stylized language, and unnecessarily complex terms.86 
For example, many long and complicated provisions in an LLC agreement provide 
nothing more than the statutory language, which would be the default outcome in 
the absence of a contradictory contract term.87 Indeed, the modern drafting process 
accommodates hoarding of complex terms into singular documents that at an 
extreme are unreadable and useless.88 
In addition to the problems it creates for the drafting attorney’s client, 
whichever investor or group of investors that may be, thoughtless drafting that relies 
too heavily on form or precedent documents can exacerbate the problem of 
information asymmetry and can leave the interests of certain investors 
underrepresented.89 In general, the regulation of publicly held companies places 
great emphasis on parity of information, at least in regard to the business operations, 
goals, and prospects.90 For example, corporations with securities traded on national 
exchanges face extensive and frequent securities disclosures that facilitate the 
efficient movement of capital in markets.91 In privately held companies, however, 
information asymmetry is less of a concern and certainly less of a legal concern in 
                                                 
86 Cunningham, supra note 3, at 315 (“[C]orporate lawyers traditionally engage in 
elaborate contracting processes and struggle to draft agreements using stylized language in 
contracts of growing density, often containing hundreds of terms.”). 
87 See Bernstein, supra note 63, at 232 (“When drafting a contract, a lawyer must decide 
when to use default rules of law, standardized provisions, or provisions specifically tailored 
to meet the needs of the client. If he selects a tailored provision, he must choose between 
state-contingent precision or general, goal oriented language. Selecting the appropriate 
option usually involves balancing negotiation costs against the increase in value that will be 
achieved if they are incurred.”); Sandra K. Miller et al., An Empirical Glimpse into Limited 
Liability Companies: Assessing the Need to Protect Minority Investors, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 
609, 621–22 (2006) (describing the dynamic between LLC agreements and statutory 
defaults). 
88 Cunningham, supra note 3, at 325 (“[A]necdotal evidence suggests that corporate 
contracting processes can be too complex and empirical evidence shows that resulting 
contract terms are prone to both oversimplification and excess complexity.”). Additionally, 
“[t]echnology is yet another cause of the ever-increasing complexity of legal documents. . . 
. Because endless additions, changes, and improvements are possible [due to modern word 
processing software], they become expected, and, eventually, inevitable.” Stein, supra note 
68, at 65. As the process of structuring and assembling documents becomes more automated, 
greater complexity will become easier than ever to achieve, hence inevitable. Id. 
89 See Davis, supra note 49, at 97 (describing how better informed parties can leverage 
the asymmetry of information for more favorable terms). 
90 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941–42 (1998) (“One 
of the most cited and intuitive goals of the securities laws is the protection of investors. . . . 
Underlying the notion of investor protection is the assumption that investors are unable to 
protect themselves. Investors may lack the resources to request information from issuers and 
analyze this information on their own.” (citation omitted)). 
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012) (identifying reporting requirements of registered 
publicly held companies). 
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terms of regulations and disclosures.92 One of the primary advantages of privately 
held companies is that they do not have the same public disclosure requirements that 
are so costly for public companies to maintain.93 But that efficiency and privacy can 
come at a cost to the transparency of the organization and the liquidity of the 
investment.94 The imbalance of information can be problematic when privately held 
companies fail to address and incorporate the interests of the limited pool of 
investors, which can lead to unclear expectations and unfortunate business failures.95 
  
                                                 
92 See Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
179, 207 (2012) (discussing the variations in publicly available information for private 
companies). 
93 See Beverley Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The New World of Risk for Corporate 
Attorneys and Their Boards Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: An Assessment of Impact and a 
Prescription for Action, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 185, 218–22 (2005) (discussing several 
accounts of the financial costs of sustaining public company status in the face of increasing 
regulatory requirements). 
94 See Robert Reilly & Aaron Rotkowski, The Discount for Lack of Marketability: 
Update on Current Studies and Analysis of Current Controversies, 61 TAX LAW. 241, 241–
42 (2007) (“[T]he security of a closely held company is not as liquid as an otherwise 
comparable security of a publicly traded company. That is, a closely held company security 
does not have the same degree of marketability as an otherwise comparable publicly traded 
security.”). 
95 Pollman, supra note 92, at 210 (“Thus, the bottom line is that market participants 
may have little to no information of the type typically considered necessary for accurate 
pricing. Varying amounts of other information may be available, but it may be inaccurate 
and misleading.”); see Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation’s Domain, 55 VILL. L. REV. 
125, 133–34 (2010) (noting that “partnership default rules enabling owners to cash out of or 
force liquidation of the firm can invite opportunistic conduct by individual members and 
possible loss of going concern value.”). 
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A stereotypical privately held company may have a money person, a property 
person, and a service (or sweat equity) person.96 Inevitably, one party to the 
transaction, arguably the money person, will be more sophisticated in dealing with 
business investments and organizational creation.97 This person will more likely be 
familiar with the documents and the legal choices involved in establishing a 
business.98 The service person, on the other hand, may understand the nature of the 
unique business being formed—the industry practices and the practical needs for 
day-to-day operations—but be less aware of the legal aspects of creating the 
company.99 
All investors are faced with complex organizational documents for even the 
simplest partnerships—documents that are difficult enough to absorb and process 
for a legally sophisticated client, let alone someone without any special legal 
knowledge.100 Poorly drafted and nearly incomprehensible organizational 
documents exacerbate the disparity of sophistication levels among the investors.101 
                                                 
96 But see Stafford v. United States, 611 F.2d 990, 995 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that the 
classification of contributions into “property” and “services” is not always entirely clear and 
can have varying tax consequences). 
97 For example, “[t]he LLC serves a broad constituency of businesses varying widely 
in sophistication, financial stature, and legal representation.” Sandra K. Miller, What 
Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More Than a Decade of 
Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 586 (2007). 
98 See Sandra K. Miller, Legal Realism, the LLC, and a Balanced Approach to the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 740 
(2010) (“[S]tudies suggest that controlling and minority investors may not be equally 
represented by counsel. They may not be actively bargaining for optimal protections.”). 
99 See, e.g., Frances S. Fendler, A License to Lie, Cheat, and Steal? Restriction or 
Elimination of Fiduciary Duties in Arkansas Limited Liability Companies, 60 ARK. L. REV. 
643, 643–44 (2007) (“The vast majority of these LLCs appear to be small businesses, and 
many if not most of them are probably formed by persons relatively unsophisticated about 
the legal rules which govern the operation of LLCs.” (citation omitted)). 
100 See Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction for LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal 
Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 407 (2003). For example: 
 
The LLC member without counsel is unlikely to comprehend the 
significance of an arbitration clause or a right to remove an LLC member or 
manager. He or she may not have the foresight to include a provision regarding 
the method of valuation and the terms and conditions of an appraisal. The LLC 
member without counsel may pay little attention to profit-sharing ratios, rights to 
compete, or choice-of-law clauses. Such an investor may understand little about 
the significance of omitting a buy-out clause upon voluntary or involuntary 
dissociation. The benefits of favorable tax treatment and a simplified managerial 
structure may well pale in comparison to the serious financial losses that can result 




101 Davis, supra note 49, at 98 (discussing the impact of uncertainty on client 
972 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
Adding to the information disparity is the general approach of organizational 
documents to value capital contributions above other types of contributions. For 
example, the business documents will specify the circumstances under which 
investors may be required to contribute additional money to the entity and the 
consequences of their failure or inability to do so. Can the services investor, who 
typically lacks the financial resources of the money investor, be absorbed by the 
others who can afford to make additional contributions? Does that investor know 
and appreciate the ramifications of those contract provisions at the outset of the 
bargain? The answer may depend on whether that investor was independently 
represented and how thorough the negotiations and drafting processes were. 
More obvious bargaining power discrepancies and incentives are involved 
when the ownership interests of the members are unequal.102 Empirical evidence 
suggests that in fact very little negotiation takes place with respect to these and other 
issues, particularly by minority interest holders.103 
Certainly the market process can help to alleviate some of the information 
disparity. Each of the investors can hire an attorney to help protect their interests and 
negotiate to make the organizational documents as beneficial to themselves as 
possible. But again, separate representation typically means that the member 
contributing cash or the majority member—who can better afford legal 
representation, has the sophistication to understand the implications, and knows 
enough to push for various concessions—is the member who will most often dictate 
the terms of the agreement.104 In the abstract, society can accept this result because 
it values the mobility of capital and because the services investor will have a 
countervailing advantage to the extent that the services (or the real estate from the 
property investor) have unique value to the operation.105 Even when the services or 
                                                 
expectations and understanding). 
102 See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (or at Least Understand Why You 
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce 
Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 563–64 
(2009); see also Miller, supra note 100, at 408 (“[M]inority investors frequently lack the 
bargaining power and/or the wherewithal to obtain effective express contractual protection 
from illegal, fraudulent, or fundamentally unfair majority conduct.”). 
103 See Miller, supra note 100, at 357 (finding that of 770 practitioners surveyed in 
California, Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania, “[o]ver two-thirds . . . believed that 
many LLC agreements are based on form agreements that are not extensively negotiated.”); 
see also Molitor, supra note 102, at 563–64 (noting that among many factors commonly 
addressed as reasons for the failure of minority shareholders to adequately protect their 
investments is their lack of sophistication and the incompetency of their counsel). 
104 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: 
Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 505 (1989) (describing some founders 
as “creative or scientific types who may previously have worked in business but who are not 
likely to be skilled or experienced in financial and legal matters.”); see also Miller, supra 
note 100, at 398 (discussing the “not-so-level playing field for majority and minority” 
contributors). 
105 “The benefits of greater capital mobility are broadly acknowledged among 
economists, though less so than the benefits of trade, even among trade’s most ardent 
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property person has the most bargaining power, they still often lack the business 
sophistication to leverage that bargaining power.106 Capital investors typically are 
more familiar with the process and know how to use legal counsel to represent their 
interests at formation.107 
Query whether this disparity and the corresponding underrepresentation of 
minority and non-cash investors is a concern or responsibility of drafting attorneys. 
Clearly not always and not entirely,108 but to the extent that attorneys are facilitating 
transactions between individuals with a common goal and vision, it behooves 
everyone for attorneys to clarify the options with respect to legal rights, obligations, 
and duties, thereby enhancing the business’s likelihood of success.109 To that end, it 
                                                 
defenders.” See Jason Bordoff & Jason Furman, Progressive Tax Reform in the Era of 
Globalization: Building Consensus for More Broadly Shared Prosperity, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 327, 342 n.54 (2008). 
106 Miller, supra note 100, at 398; see also Molitor, supra note 102, at 563–64 (citing 
minority participants’ failure to anticipate unfair treatment by the majority, their overzealous 
optimism, and their reluctance to discuss difficult issues during formation for fear of 
damaging their relationship of trust with the majority as common reasons for minority 
owners’ lack of initial planning in new business ventures). 
107 See Miller, supra note 100, at 354–58 (reporting that respondents from a survey of 
business attorneys in four states tended to represent majority LLC owners, with 56% 
reporting they had represented majority owners while only 20% had represented minority 
owners). 
 
The low overall rate of usage of contractual minority protections tends to 
paint a portrait of a not-so-level playing field for majority and minority 
participants. Legal counsel for minority investors may be unaware of the value of 
enacting express contractual protections against majority misconduct, or may 
otherwise be unable to effectively negotiate for the inclusion of such protections 
in the operating agreement. 
 
Id. at 398. 
108 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 104, at 503 (“In the case of unequal ownership, at 
points of conflict counsel is obligated to advise the majority that it must deal fairly with the 
minority, and counsel may even be expected by the minority to represent their interests.”); 
Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “Non-Clients”: Reconceptualizing the 
Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous 
Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 664–65 (1994) (explaining that “the law looks primarily to 
the actual intentions of the parties, whether express or implied[, to determine the existence 
of an attorney-client relationship]. Unfortunately, all too often the parties have not thought 
about the matter in precisely those terms, and yet the ‘clients’ may have relied on the 
attorneys to protect their interests in the transaction or proceeding. This reliance is 
particularly notable in cases involving entity-constituent relations, in which lay individuals 
typically do not view the entity in the same abstract manner as do lawyers. Thus, in the entity 
context, individual constituents frequently rely on the entity lawyer to protect their interests.” 
(citation omitted)). 
109 Cf. Moore, supra note 108, at 664 (“Multiple representation is permitted because it 
is sometimes in the best interests of the clients to risk the inherent dangers of multiple 
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is equally important to recognize the potential for the attorney’s role to exacerbate, 
or at least be complacent in, information disparity and underrepresentation, which 
can thwart a transaction.110 
More thoughtful drafting can assist in overcoming problems associated with 
information disparities and take into account interests of all investors in a way that 
promotes long-term stability. Structuring and drafting organizational agreements in 
a more accessible manner gives voice to non-money contributors and minority 
interest holders and thus strengthens the enterprise as a whole. 
 
III.  CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNING DOCUMENTS: MAKING 
THE ANALOGY 
 
Scholars have long analogized between business entities and political bodies.111 
The vast majority of this scholarship has focused on the corporate form, with its 
clear delineation between managerial authority and ownership.112 The parallels 
between the corporation and the state are clear. The shareholders of the corporation 
are equivalent to democratic citizens who carry the right to vote.113 These corporate 
                                                 
representation to achieve a significant benefit in the form of either cheaper and more efficient 
representation or an enhanced ability to resolve minor differences and reach a shared goal.”). 
110 Molitor, supra note 102, at 496 (“While normally [protecting the interest of business 
owners during entity formation] is a function that attorneys should perform, the sad fact is 
that this does not appear to be happening with an acceptable frequency, as demonstrated by 
the never-ending litigation involving minority owner abuse.”). 
111 See, e.g., Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from 
the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1351 (2006) (“As 
an economic institution, a corporation is also necessarily a political institution, for it is 
peopled by individuals—shareholders, managers, employees—whose relations are 
structured by the particular distributions of power that have come to characterize the 
enterprise.”); Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and Executive Privilege, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 301, 340 (2009) (“[C]orporation law in the United States treats corporations as 
‘representative democrac[ies]’ in which shareholders do not directly control decisions but 
may vote in new management when they desire a change.” (quoting Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV 833, 837 (2005 )). 
112 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 837 (2005) (“The U.S. corporation can be regarded as a ‘representative 
democracy’ in which the members of the polity can act only through their representatives 
and never directly.”); Dunlavy, supra note 111, at 1353 (“In elections that . . . resembled 
those of ‘representatives to Congress and to all similar legislative bodies,’ shareholders 
selected representatives (directors) to sit in a representative assembly (the board of directors) 
to which the corporation’s constitution ascribed certain powers.” (quoting Brothers Under 
Their Skins, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1937, at 4)); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of 
Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 753 (1984) (“[T]he stockholder-manager relation is 
but a special case of the more general relation between those who have a ‘right’ to control 
an organization (ordinarily, residual risk-bearers) and those decision makers (managers) who 
in fact make most of the important organizational decisions.”). 
113 Michael J. Duffy, Shareholder Democracy or Shareholder Plutocracy? Corporate 
Governance and the Plight of Small Shareholders, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 434, 438 (2002) 
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citizens elect directors to the board in the same way voters elect representatives to 
legislative bodies.114 However, the analogy is ultimately limited because 
investments in corporations are voluntary and liquid, and there are substantive 
differences in the voting rights of each constituency.115 Nonetheless, the parallels 
can inform our understanding of the different structures.  
Instead of corporations, this Article focuses on private unincorporated business 
organizations, primarily in various forms of partnerships and limited liability 
companies—the most popular entities in terms of sheer quantity of formations.116 
The resemblance of these private business organizations to government entities is 
not quite as apparent as in the corporate realm, but the comparison yields rich 
analogies. 
LLCs and other unincorporated business organizations behave in many ways 
like corporations, but the structures essentially merge the management and 
ownership functions.117 In a corporate board of directors, a one-ninth vote by one of 
the directors does not correlate to that director’s ownership interest in the 
corporation. On the other hand, a shareholder carries a vote proportionate to his 
ownership interest, but has no authority to act on behalf of the corporation on a day-
to-day basis.118 In contrast, in an LLC, the equity holders (i.e., the members) 
typically manage the company, act on behalf of the company, and set company 
                                                 
(“There are observable parallels between the corporation and the state. For example, in the 
democratic state the members are citizens carrying the right to vote, whilst in the corporation 
the members are shareholders.”). 
114 Id. at 438. 
115 Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1389–90 (2006) (“[C]omparisons between the [public] 
corporate and civic polities, while intellectually tempting, ultimately falter because 
participation in a corporation fundamentally differs from participation in a nation. 
Shareholders are not citizens; their investments are voluntary and relatively liquid, and their 
proxy ballots lack the meaning and power of citizens’ votes.”); see also Duffy, supra note 
113, at 438–42 (noting significant ways in which corporate governance and civic governance 
differ, including that voting power is not typically equal among shareholders in a corporation 
as it is for most citizens of a democratic nation). Additionally, a corporation’s “constituency” 
is continually shifting due to the high trading volume of most public companies, leading to 
a “divergence between ownership and control” of the company and placing “heightened 
importance” on the availability of information about the company. Id. at 441. 
116 See Molitor, supra note 102, at 501 (noting that “every state has an LLC statute and 
the LLC is viewed by many as the ‘entity of choice’ for small businesses.” (citation omitted)); 
see also Miller, supra note 100, at 385 (noting that studies have recognized the “growing 
popularity” of the LLC); Ribstein, supra note 95, at 127 (positing that “uncorporate business 
forms are likely to become more important for a wide variety of firms”). 
117 Moore, supra note 108, at 678 (“[U]nlike the publicly held corporation, the 
ownership and management [of closely held corporations and small partnerships] are 
substantially identical.”). 
118 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141 (2015); 12 U.S.C. § 61 (2012) (“In all elections 
of directors, each shareholder shall have the right to vote the number of shares owned by him 
for as many persons as there are directors to be elected . . . .”). 
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policy.119 Thus the analogy to a representative government, where a group of people 
is chosen to act on behalf of the others, seems slightly weaker for an LLC, especially 
a member-managed LLC, than for a corporation. 
Fundamentally, investors in any entity differ from citizens of a national 
government. Regardless of their economic contribution (through taxes or otherwise) 
or service commitment to the nation, each citizen usually gets roughly equal 
representation in national affairs in most democratic institutions.120 Although there 
is variance in indirect representation models like the U.S. Senate, generally speaking 
each citizen gets equal representation and an equal vote in national referenda.121 In 
contrast, investors in business enterprises can contribute different amounts of 
capital, which typically results in different levels of influence and control on the 
entity’s operations.122 Although on a per-unit or per-share basis, the representation 
is usually equal, the bottom line is that some members have more say than others 
(and most would say rightfully so).123 These distinctions are important in considering 
the mechanics for adjustments to the organizational document and the impact on the 
bargain. 
Further, unlike contractual agreements enforced by courts, successful 
constitutions are generally self-enforcing so that it is in the best interest of all 
factions to abide by the terms of the document.124 A constitution can be seen as a 
delicate equilibrium—to be effective, no entity with the power to defect should have 
enough incentive to do so.125 Functionally, constitutions define violations of 
government power—they specifically delineate when a government has overstepped 
its bounds, so that all citizens are aware and will recognize the power and utility of 
coordination to enforce the document.126 This dynamic in turn makes it less likely 
                                                 
119 See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the 
Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 385 (1992) (“Most of the LLC statutes provide for 
management directly by the members, although the statutes permit the parties to provide, by 
agreement, for centralized management.”). 
120 Duffy, supra note 113, at 438. 
121 Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has 
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 22 (1997) (discussing “‘[t]he right of a citizen to equal 
representation and to have his vote weighted equally with those of all other citizens’ in both 
houses of a bicameral legislature.” (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964)). 
122 Keatinge et al., supra note 119, at 385 (“The standard statutory terms (which 
generally may be waived by the members) provide that the members’ rights to participate in 
profits, distributions and governance will be allocated according to financial contributions 
and withdrawals, rather than equally as in general partnerships.”). 
123 See id. at 414 (“The [LLC] statutes generally direct that the members’ voting rights 
will be in proportion to their interests in the LLC’s profits.”). 
124 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (“A constitution will be maintained only if it 
makes sense to those who live under its dictates, so a crucial quality of any successful 
constitution is that it be self-enforcing.”). 
125 See id. at 76–78 (noting that “when those who would breach recognize that their 
breach will be met with coordinated resistance, they restrain themselves from acting in the 
first place.”). 
126 Richard Albert, The Cult of Constitutionalism, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 390 
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that the government will overstep its authority in the first place, which makes the 
document more self-enforcing.127 
But LLCs and other private unincorporated business enterprises are largely 
creatures of contract law.128 Like corporations, they are voluntary structures where 
participants agree to contribute to the organization and cede control over such 
contributions—cash, property, labor—to the group for the efficient functioning of 
the entity.129 At the end of the day, a private business enterprise is an agreement by 
its constituent parties to tie their fates together, to cede authority and control over 
their resources to the others, and to participate in a larger enterprise. In the business 
enterprise, the primary common objective of the arrangement is generating a profit 
for its owners as opposed to the numerous other considerations that may be in play 
in establishing a government. 
Although LLC structures are distinct from representative governments in 
important ways, the documents governing each structure overlap to a large extent. 
In fact, at the time when the entity is first formed—whether LLC, corporation, or 
government130—the analogy is the strongest. The founders of a state or the owners 
of an organization negotiate the terms by which they will agree to work together and 
pursue mutual interests. Without any previous obligations to each other or rights 
with respect to each other, participants undertake a mutual commitment and design 
the terms by which that relationship will operate, defining the rights, duties, and 
obligations of the parties and the organization. In this way, a constitution and an 
operating agreement serve similar functions. Among their functions, constitutions 
                                                 
(2012) (“All constitutions do three things. First, constitutions separate powers by creating an 
internal structure of authority that serves as a referent for disputes. Second, constitutions 
identify or create a class of constituents who must govern themselves according to it. Third, 
constitutions embrace a purpose or a mission that guides constituents and their governors in 
the conduct of their affairs, both internal to the group and external toward the wider world.”); 
see also ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 77 (emphasizing that “the shared expectations and 
common knowledge are central to constitutional enforcement.” (citation omitted)). 
127 Ginsburg et al., supra note 23, at 216 (“Constitutions help resolve . . . coordination 
problem[s] by generating common knowledge about the scope of acceptable government 
behavior and by providing a focal point for citizens to organize enforcement efforts.” 
(citation omitted)). 
128 1 NICHOLAS G. KARAMBELAS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: LAW, PRACTICE & 
FORMS § 6:14 (2d ed. 2014) (“An operating agreement is contractual in nature and binds the 
members of the LLC as it is written.”); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and 
Corporate Indeterminancy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 133 (“Uncorporate business forms 
[LPs, LLCs] rely on specific contractual devices to provide incentives and managerial 
discipline, reducing their need to rely on monitoring devices such as owner voting, 
independent directors, fiduciary duties, and derivative litigation. The parties, therefore, can 
tailor their contracts to their needs, and courts do not need to develop fiduciary rules to deal 
with a multitude of situations.” (citation omitted)). 
129 Keatinge et al., supra note 119, at 412. 
130 Dunlavy, supra note 111, at 1352 (“A first step in conceptualizing relations among 
shareholders is to note that every corporation, every ‘body politic,’ has a constitutional 
structure, spelled out in statute law and in the company’s bylaws.”). 
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limit the behavior of government, defining the nation, its aspirations, and its patterns 
of authority, and establishing necessary institutions.131 Similarly, the operating 
agreement is the source document that sets forth the purpose and authority of the 
organization and defines the rights and obligations of the members of the entity.132 
Thus, approaches to constitutional design can enlighten drafting of 
organizational documents that govern business relationships. Even short of a perfect 
analogy, lessons learned from constitutional drafting can inform our approach to 
business organizational drafting. 
 
IV.  ENDURANCE 
 
Part II above details the need to approach organizational document drafting 
from a different, more deliberate perspective. The pervasiveness of perfunctory 
consultation and unwieldy work products speaks to the need to look to a variety of 
sources for design considerations. Though business and transactional attorneys 
could refine and improve their drafting process and the resulting product in any 
number of ways,133 this Article advocates looking to constitutional design literature 
for a deliberate and thoughtful drafting approach. Constitutional design focuses on 
endurance134 and although stakeholders in a newly formed entity often have widely 
divergent expectations with respect to the length of their commitment, endurance 
can be a guiding objective for business drafters in many situations because it can 
facilitate a more thoughtful, collaborative drafting process resulting in documents 
that are more reflective of unique client objectives. 
In constitutional design literature, endurance is a consistently espoused 
objective for drafters of constitutions.135 Recent empirical research has shown that 
constitutional endurance is positively associated with societies that have higher per 
capita GDP, are more democratic, and are more politically stable.136 Although design 
                                                 
131 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 38–39. 
132 Laurie A. Ronholdt & Alex Pederson, Tips For Drafting and Issues Presented by 
LLC Operating Agreements, PRAC. TAX LAW., Fall 2008, at 7, 7 (“The operating agreement 
is the governing document for an LLC, in which the business relationship among LLC 
members, the activities in which the entity may engage, and administrative procedures for 
the LLC are all described.”). 
133 Other improvements could simply address some of the concerns about drafting 
detailed in Part III above, including providing better context for documents on electronic 
databases through consistent and detailed file organization and providing extensive (and 
again, consistent across departments) training for new transactional associates. 
134 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Endurance, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (noting that 
“constitutional scholars . . . have generally assumed that endurance is valuable.”). 
135 See Hirschl, supra note 16, at 1353 (“Endurance may be an intuitive criterion by 
which to measure the relative success of a given constitution.”); see also Ginsburg et al., 
supra note 23, at 216 (arguing that endurance is an important criterion for constitutional 
success). 
136 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 32–33. 
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theorists make no claim of causation,137 the most prosperous nations in the world are 
among those with the longest tenured constitutions.138 
Aside from the economic benefits associated with constitutional endurance, 
prevailing constitutional design theory suggests that document endurance is 
beneficial because it fosters a sense of national identity and unity.139 This viewpoint 
is in contrast to some American founders’ views that periodic review and 
generationally timed replacement would accommodate better institutions, keep the 
public more active in the process, and better reflect changes in technology and 
constituencies.140 To the contrary, empirical studies reveal that frequent replacement 
results in less innovation and perhaps more vacillations.141 
The following sections first make the case that endurance is a proper objective 
and framework for structuring some business enterprises and then describe the 
components of enduring design identified in the constitutional design literature. 
 
A.  The Normative Case 
 
Scholars argue that endurance is appropriate, from a normative standpoint, for 
constitutional design.142 That is, scholars defend the validity of the underlying 
assumption that constitutions, particularly those for formative democracies, ought to 
be written to endure.143 Enduring constitutions promote civil obedience because the 
                                                 
137 Id. (recognizing that statistical associations do not necessarily demonstrate a causal 
relationship). 
138 Ginsburg, supra note 134, at 115 (“The suggestive evidence is strong, however: . . . 
no rich democratic country has had high levels of constitutional turnover, while nine of the 
ten longest currently living constitutions belong to [the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development] members.”). 
139 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 20 (noting that “constitutions can help instill in the 
citizenry a sense of shared identity.”). 
140 Id. at 22 (“Arguments on Madison’s side include a role in facilitating 
precommitment, binding a sometimes diverse and multitudinous citizenry, fostering the 
development of ancillary institutions, and a potential instrumental benefit in facilitating 
investment and economic activity. In most respects, the debate reduces to the perennial 
tension between flexibility and commitment.”); see also Ken I. Kersch, The Talking Cure: 
How Constitutional Argument Drives Constitutional Development, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1083, 
1086–87 (2014) (“The [U.S.] Constitution is not an iron cage. We are not its prisoners. 
Although the road to change has often been bitter and hard-fought, the Constitution has 
always been subject to new, reordering interpretations capable of meeting new social, 
economic, and political challenges.” (citations omitted)). 
141 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 23–24 (noting that the Jeffersonian arguments may 
overstate the case that replacement brings innovation and finding instead “churn,” where 
despite replacing their constitutions frequently, countries “remain anchored to the same 
institutional choices,” and “cycling,” where “a country caught in the grip of two competing 
and irreconcilable groups will bounce back and forth between constitutions according to 
which group is in power.”). 
142 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
143 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 35 (“On balance, our sense is that enduring 
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rules are predictable and stable.144 Endurance allows for the development of 
“collateral institutions” (like political parties) that are invested in the governing 
process and will resist rapid unnecessary changes, insisting instead on gradual 
measured change.145 Endurance also assists in the bargaining process during the 
creation of the document because each side operates closer to a “veil of ignorance,” 
not knowing what position it may hold in the long-term future.146 
The case for endurance as a normative goal in the business organizational 
context is more nuanced. In a government structure, a diverse citizenry has agreed 
to abide by a system of governance of behavior and social structure.147 Participants 
have entrusted their safety and their fortune and have given up some level of 
autonomy to join the society, and as such, they want the stability that an enduring 
construct brings,148 which may not always be the case in the formation of a small 
business organization. 
In a small company, investors can have myriad motivations and temporal 
expectations for their investment time frame. Some will be investing with short-term 
gains in mind. For example, arbitragers who are seeking to take advantage of an 
announced takeover are by definition short-term investors who are not interested in 
the longevity of the structure or the viability of the company.149 This lack of long-
term motivation also extends to certain early-round investors, like venture capital or 
private equity firms, who seek a preferred return and then plan to cash out at the time 
                                                 
constitutions are good for young democracies.”). 
144 Ginsburg, supra note 134, at 113; see also Hirschl, supra note 16, at 1354 (noting 
that “a constitution is supposed to accomplish, or at least facilitate, the accomplishment of 
substantive goals.”). 
145 Ginsburg, supra note 134, at 113; see also Hirschl, supra note 16, at 1340 (noting 
that constitutional design may “set the foundations for a nexus of political institutions and 
procedures that would allow for long-term unity, peace, and stability.”). 
146 Ginsburg, supra note 134, at 113–14 (“[S]tability is a distinct dimension of 
constitutional choice that can improve bargaining incentives. As time horizons lengthen, 
each drafter’s ability to predict the position she will hold in subsequent arrangements, and 
so the negotiation takes on the quality of a veil of ignorance. This might itself produce fairer 
or more impartial rules.”). 
147 See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical 
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 847–56 (1985) (discussing 
Thomas Hobbes’ social contract theory). 
148 Id. 
149 See Robert Willens, Tax Benefits of Merger Arbitrage Survive Code’s Hostility to 
Rate ‘Conversions,’ 92 J. TAX. 235, 236 (2000) (“[T]he arbitrageur will purchase the stock 
of the target corporation and sell an appropriate number of shares . . . of the acquiring entity. 
If the merger closes, the arbitrageur will earn the merger ‘spread’—the discount to the 
transaction price that existed when the trade was originated. The arbitrageur’s net profit is 
that spread, reduced by the interest cost associated with the funds procured to carry the 
positions and, of course, taxes. If these taxes . . . can be reduced by an amount that exceeds 
the added cost to carry the positions for the period necessary to turn the short-term capital 
gain into a long-term capital gain, the arbitrageur’s net profits will be correspondingly 
enhanced.”). 
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of a sale to another company or at the company’s initial public offering.150 
The initial public offering scenario itself is a helpful example when considering 
longevity of a private company. Commonly, founders initially choose LLCs or 
partnership structures for tax purposes during their formative stages so that the likely 
losses in the start-up phase will pass through to give the investors tax benefits in the 
first few years of the company’s existence.151 Then, when the company looks to 
make an initial public offering, it will often convert to the corporate form (so that it 
can be listed on a national exchange) and incorporate in Delaware.152 Accordingly, 
founders often anticipate dramatic evolutions of company structures and 
organizational choices. 
But not all organizations anticipate such dramatic evolution. In fact, most 
companies are small operations and likely intend to stay that way.153 To the extent 
                                                 
150 THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 9–10 (3d ed. 2013) (“For . . . [venture capital (VC)] investors, the time horizon 
for use of their capital varies, but is usually somewhere between three to seven years. This 
means that when the VC firm invests its capital and buys stock in the start-up company, the 
VC firm usually considers its exit strategy as part of its overall investment decision. The goal 
of these financial investors is usually to obtain the return on their invested capital along with 
a certain rate of return on their investment. The VC (or [Private Equity (PE)]) investor’s goal, 
however, often may be at odds with the founding shareholder(s) of the company, who 
frequently are entrepreneur(s) who closely identify with the business of the company. . . . 
Among the exit strategies typically considered by a VC or PE investor is the sale of the 
business to another company.”). 
151 Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Venture Capital Start-Up: The Myth of 
Incorporation, 55 TAX LAW. 923, 925 (2002) (“The partnership/LLC structure . . . facilitates 
the pass-through of losses incurred in the business to the partners. Each partner includes on 
his tax return his distributive share of the partnership’s losses from operations. In contrast, 
losses incurred by a corporation (other than an electing S corporation) remain in the 
corporation to be carried back or carried forward to the extent there is income to offset in 
past or future years. But the losses are not available for use by the shareholders themselves.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Bradley T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion of Partners’ 
Interests in a Partnership, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2011) (“The complexity of the 
partnership tax rules derives in part from the nature of tax partnerships. Tax partnerships do 
not pay income tax; instead, all partnership income flows through to the partners, and they 
report it on their individual returns. Each partner reports a share of the income in accordance 
with the partnership tax allocation rules.” (citation omitted)). 
152 See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 401 (3d ed. 2012) (“Prior to going public, the business, the lead underwriter, and 
attorney will reconfigure the various ownership interests and state law entities into a single 
corporate form with common stock ownership. . . . As part of the process of reorganizing for 
the initial public offering, businesses incorporated in other states will typically reincorporate 
in Delaware.”). 
153 See Sandra K. Miller, The Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and 
Contractual Freedom in Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 316 (2014) 
(“[C]ensus data from 2012 indicates that approximately 92% of American business 
enterprises reported receipts under $1 million. Moreover, an astonishing 76% reported 
receipts under $100,000. This data leads one to conclude that relatively small enterprises 
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that a private enterprise does not want or anticipate dramatic growth and change, 
document endurance may have a great deal of value. Given the significant legal costs 
of setting up an organization, one of the primary measures of value of the legal 
services may be the ability of the document to withstand the test of time. Thus some 
business clients may want and appreciate documents that are long-lived and resilient 
in the face of change. 
For example, the owners of a local hardware store, a multimember dental 
practice, or restaurateurs may have very modest goals with respect to growth and 
evolution of the enterprise. Instead, the more natural changes for those smaller 
organizations will be members coming in and out of the company, the death of a 
member, the acquisition of another piece of property, restructuring of debt, and other 
changes that, although perhaps significant to the organization’s identity, are not 
necessarily structural modifications. These are more incremental changes, which a 
well-crafted document can accommodate without needing to be completely 
rewritten.154 Accordingly, the concept of endurance can be an appropriate touchstone 
for business attorneys creating these organizations. 
It is entirely possible, however, that an enduring business organizational 
document would be nearly meaningless in certain circumstances. A company may 
endure in name and structure, but may change so significantly over time that the 
investors may be better served by redrafting an organizational document that more 
accurately reflects the new institution.155 Endurance in that context is arguably not 
valuable to the initial client because although the bare bones framework is the same, 
the operation of the enterprise is not what the client had envisioned during the 
drafting process. 
                                                 
constitute an extremely significant part of the American economy.” (citations omitted)). 
154 See Keatinge et al., supra note 119, at 417 (discussing the flexibility LLC organizers 
have in an environment of minimal statutory requirements). 
155 This occurrence parallels the philosophical puzzle of the Ship of Theseus, 
questioning whether the ship remained the same Ship of Theseus after the old planks of the 
ship were removed and replaced gradually piece by piece so that eventually the entire ship 
consisted of new material. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 551, 591 (2006) (citing THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY, THE 
FIRST SECTION, CONCERNING BODY 99–100 (London, R. & W. Leybourn 1656)). 
And so it goes with law firms, many of which trace their history by representation of a 
particular client. See, e.g., History, FRIDAY, ELDREDGE & CLARK, 
http://fridayfirm.com/about-the-firm/history/, archived at http://perma.cc/9VGD-8WF7 (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2015). For example, the Arkansas law firm of  
 
Friday, Eldredge & Clark traces its history to December 1, 1871, when attorneys 
George E. Dodge and Benjamin S. Johnson formed a partnership for the practice 
of law, representing what was then known as the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and 
Southern Railroad, one of Arkansas’s first major legal clients. In 1982, Union 
Pacific Railroad Company acquired Missouri Pacific Railroad, and the firm 
continues to represent the dominant railroad in Arkansas. 
 
Id. 
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An enduring framework that incorporates maximum flexibility can allow an 
institution to adjust to exogenous shocks, market fluctuations, personnel changes, 
and the like. But the day-to-day picture of the institution is less fixed; the 
organization may be dramatically changed in the way it operates or what it does. 
Endurance by itself is an unrealistic objective for every agreement. When 
creating a constitution, the stakes are high and drafters have clear incentives to be 
deliberate and careful in structuring the national government.156 But in the context 
of business organizations, many deals will be fairly simple, often with clients 
operating on a shoestring budget who wish to minimize legal costs.157 Nonetheless, 
allowing the framework of endurance to inform the drafting process gives the 
attorney a fresh perspective in which to view the various structural choices and 
alternatives. If attorneys approach the organizational process mindful of the 
mechanisms that give rise to endurance in other contexts, they can overcome status 
quo bias in their drafting and produce arrangements that better inform client 
expectations and better reflect unique client objectives. 
The obvious question is then, at what expense does this more deliberate and 
custom drafting come? If an approach designed for endurance significantly increases 
the legal bill, one can assume few clients will pay for such services. My response is 
threefold. First, endurance might not be an appropriate objective for every 
organizational agreement. The participants may decide that they want a short-term 
and inflexible arrangement, designed to accomplish a single narrow objective. The 
founders may also prefer to simply spend as little time and money on the formal 
arrangement as possible and work with a bare-bones structure that merely sets forth 
the ownership percentages and management authority, and provides some state law 
protections. In the same sense that a client might not want to hire a large expensive 
law firm to provide a basic agreement, the client might not want to pay any 
additional amount for a more custom product. One cannot fault startups on small 
budgets for minimizing their expenses, even if they risk getting a problematic 
document. Second, in Part V of this Article, I describe ways of incorporating the 
enduring design in ways that could actually provide for more efficient, and cost-
effective, delivery of legal services. In particular, promoting standardization of 
language in private agreements and developing forms with readily accessible 
alternative provision not only allows for more conscious choices in drafting, but can 
also streamline the process. Third, as developed below in Part IV.B.3 on 
“Specificity,” increasing the time and expense of drafting an organizational 
document is not always a bad thing. Clients taking the time to make more decisions 
and invest more resources at the front end of a business relationship may be more 
committed to making the relationship last and to working through conflicts. While 
                                                 
156 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 10 (discussing the importance and difficulties 
of establishing an enduring constitution in new democracies). 
157 See Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 
10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 131 (1987) (“Because people generally avoid complex and 
expensive planning in small businesses, certain problems are difficult to anticipate even 
when the parties attempt to articulate mutual expectations. Absent an adversarial setting, they 
keep lawyer involvement to the minimum.” (citation omitted)). 
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it would be counterproductive to unduly bind partners with excessive front-end 
sunken costs, there is also value in sorting through significant potential conflicts 
early and, among other items, ensuring all parties agree with the dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
 
B.  Components of Endurance 
 
Drawing from institutional design research related to constitutions, certain 
elements associated with longer-lived constitutions can facilitate more predictable 
and useful business organizational documents and at the same time address the 
problems that arise from overreliance on form or precedent documents. Endurance 
can inform the drafting process in a way that results in more stable business 
structures, more clarity in organizational choices, and more usable documents for 
clients. It can serve as a guidepost during the drafting process to advance client goals 
and provide better value to clients by facilitating resilience of the institution. A focus 
on endurance can also clarify the bargaining process and the stakes of the agreement 
at the outset. At the same time, more thorough negotiations and structures can 
mitigate the problems associated with disparate bargaining power and varying 
sophistication in business matters. 
According to Professors Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, 
specific design features that make a constitution more likely to endure include 
flexible conditions that are easy to amend (and thus can adjust to political or social 
shocks), greater public involvement in the creation of the document and the 
maintenance of the institution, and specificity, which represents greater investment 
on the part of the drafters.158 The professors “analyzed an original set of cross-
national historical data,” and found that their “theory holds up fairly well. . . . [T]he 
design features that [they] expected to be consequential are indeed so. In particular, 
the amendment procedure, detail of the constitution, and a level of inclusiveness all 
seem to have a decided impact on constitutional endurance.”159 The following 
sections unpack each of these elements, explain the findings of Elkins and his 
colleagues, and make analogies to the business context. 
 
1.  Flexibility 
 
After the initial bargain is struck, parties to an organizational agreement often 
face numerous challenges in the operation of the enterprise, including dramatic and 
unanticipated changes in the environment in which the organization operates. If 
these changes fundamentally alter the incentives for the parties to remain committed 
to the entity and if the entity structure is unsuited to adjust to the changed 
circumstances, the entity’s days are numbered. 
  
                                                 
158 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 8, 78–92. 
159 Id. at 146. 
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Elkins and his colleagues suggest that in order to endure, “constitutions require 
mechanisms for adjustment over time.”160 Thus, constitutions are more likely to 
remain intact if they are flexible enough to be easily amended.161 Given 
unpredictable—or rather, predictable but unknown—exogenous shocks that can 
alter the costs and benefits of the parties involved in the constitution’s creation, 
flexibility can allow a document to be modified as necessary to “adjust to the 
emergence of new social and political forces.”162 A malleable document is more 
likely to be adjusted than jettisoned in its entirety.163 
Measuring ease of amendability by both formal amendment procedures and 
observed amendment rate,164 Elkins and his colleagues found support for their theory 
that “constitutions with lower thresholds for amendment will be more flexible and 
likely to survive in the face of constitutional crisis.”165 However, these benefits do 
not extend to an unlimited degree of flexibility.166 Too much flexibility can 
undermine a document’s longevity in unpredictable ways.167 Without sufficient 
stability in its governing document, a nation may be unable to provide and enforce 
lasting rules of conduct for itself and its population.168 But absent extreme flexibility,  
 
                                                 
160 Id. at 81. 
161 “The main point is that the existence of some method for adjustment to changing 
conditions over time forestalls pressure for more total revision.” Id. at 83; see also Hirschl, 
supra note 16, at 1349 (“As is well known, the amending procedures of some constitutions 
(e.g., the United States) are distinctly rigid and thus quite ineffective in allowing for self-
adjustment. Amending formulae elsewhere (e.g., Germany) are more flexible, thereby 
allowing for adjustments while still entrenching the basic rules of the political game. As the 
U.S. example illustrates, overrigid constitutions may lead to fierce debates concerning 
interpretive approaches (e.g., the living constitution vs. originalism), as interpretation, not 
amendment, becomes the main constitutional adjustment mechanism.” (citations omitted)). 
162 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 82. 
163 Id. at 99 (explaining that an “amendment operates as a substitute for constitutional 
replacement, and often a more desirable substitute given the higher costs of replacement.”); 
see also Albert, supra note 126, at 380 (“Malleability, impressionability, and 
manipulability—those are the defining characteristics of a constitution according to the 
functional conception of constitutionalism.”). 
164 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 100. 
165 Id. at 99. 
166 Albert, supra note 126, at 407 (“On the one hand, flexibility is an asset because it 
allows a constitutional community to develop organically, to meet pressing needs, or even to 
respond to crises that the textual amendment procedures cannot accommodate either for time 
constraints or because of exacting supermajority thresholds. On the other hand, this measure 
of flexibility risks undermining the transparency that constitutionalism should foster.” 
(citation omitted)); see also ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 81–83 (discussing the strengths 
and weaknesses of a flexible constitution). 
167 See Albert, supra note 126, at 407; see also ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 82 (“To 
be sure, if taken to an extreme, flexibility undermines the very notion of constitutionalism as 
a set of stable limits on ordinary politics. If a constitution is completely flexible, . . . it may 
not be able to provide enduring rules that bind the polity together.”). 
168 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 82. 
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amendment procedures that facilitate both formal and informal adjustments in a 
constitution will increase its lifespan.169 
Business entities, like governments, can benefit from the flexibility to adjust to 
changing conditions.170 Where a state might have to respond to a new threat to 
national security, substantial change in population (numbers or makeup), or rapid 
inflation, a business might have to adjust to new marketplace competitors, the loss 
of key shareholders or managers, or declining demand for its products. 
The choice of entity itself can reflect this needed flexibility. LLCs are often 
favored for their relatively flexible structures,171 whereas S corporations (with their 
restrictions on the kind and number of eligible investors) are eschewed by many 
formative stage enterprises.172 But the mechanisms for amending the organizational 
document itself are also important. 
The degree of flexibility incorporated into an organizational document exists 
on a spectrum, and attorneys and investors have a wide range of choices by which 
to include it into the business structure. Where and how flexibility is achieved may 
impact the level and type of endurance that is facilitated. In general, flexible 
amendment procedures in constitutions result, the empirical evidence suggests, in 
longer lasting constitutions—the documents themselves are less likely to be 
completely abandoned rather than amended to adjust to new challenges.173 On the 
business side, the appropriate inquiry, when deciding where and how to include 
flexibility, perhaps should be on whether the investors value stability of the 
document itself versus stability of the business operation.  
                                                 
169 Id. at 100. 
170 See Terence C. Krell, Organizational Longevity and Technological Change, 13 J. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT. 8, 9 (2000) (“Different types of organizations are 
required to deal with different types of environments, with the result that, as environments 
change, so must the organization. The more rapidly changing the environment, the more 
dynamic and flexible the organization must be.”). 
171 Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a 
Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 803 (2004) (“LLCs are specifically designed to be 
more flexible than corporations and can be organized as manager-managed entities.”); 
Miller, supra note 100, at 354 (“In the LLC context, the contractarian framework now offers 
LLC investors unparalleled freedom to limit their legal rights and responsibilities.”); 
Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 132, at 7 (“An LLC is a flexible entity and members may 
creatively structure profits, losses, allocations and distributions, and many other elements of 
their relationship in ways that are unavailable to some other entity forms.”). 
172 See 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (2012) (requiring S corporations to have less than one 
hundred shareholders, permitting only individuals and certain types of trusts to be 
shareholders, prohibiting foreign shareholders, and allowing only one class of stock); cf. Eric 
C. Chaffee, Business Organizations and Tribal Self-Determination: A Critical 
Reexamination of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 107, 144–45 
(2008) (arguing that rather than requiring Alaska Natives to adopt the corporate form in order 
to benefit from the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the drafters should have used LLPs 
or LLCs because their flexibility allows a group to determine its own governance structure). 
173 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 99–100 (cautioning that the “effects of extreme 
flexibility” on constitutional endurance are uncertain). 
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The focus of constitutional design scholars has been the relative ease of 
amendment of the constitution174 and the most direct analogy to the business setting 
is the amendability of the organizational documents. Amendment thresholds for 
organizational agreements vary from a majority vote of the equity holders (usually 
measured by interest, not per capita) at a quorum meeting to unanimous consent of 
all equity holders.175 Generally speaking, most entities allow the operating (or 
partnership) agreement to be amended by a majority or supermajority of the vote 
(which voting interest is typically tied to capital investment).176 It is difficult to argue 
against pairing member/partner votes with their relative investment in the enterprise. 
A person would be reluctant to contribute 50% of the start-up funding for a new 
organization if she were to only hold 10% of the voting power. Along those lines, 
changes to the organization that require amendment of the operating agreement 
should be accomplished only with significant consent from the members. Perhaps 
the concept of easy amendability then suggests favoring only a simple majority (as 
opposed to a supermajority) vote to amend. However, there are downsides to lower 
amendment thresholds for business enterprises, including the potential to undermine 
the expectations of investors when change occurs rapidly and equity holders are not 
able to decide whether to remain invested in the business before the change is 
implemented. 
  
                                                 
174 See generally id. at 99–103 (suggesting that “low thresholds for amendment will 
generally be associated with [constitutional] endurance.”). 
175 Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 132, at 9 (discussing quorum and vote thresholds). 
176 This is a common statutory default. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-403(a) (2001) 
(“Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement or this chapter, and subject to 
subsection (b) of this section, the affirmative vote, approval or consent of more than one-half 
(½) by number of the members, if management of the limited liability company is vested in 
the members, or of the managers if the management of the limited liability company is vested 
in managers, shall be required to decide any matter connected with the business of the limited 
liability company.”). 
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Lower thresholds are more often present in organizations with numerous 
shareholders, and higher thresholds are more typical in very closely held entities.177 
One of the purposes of higher amendment thresholds in constitutional bargains is to 
protect minority interests.178 State laws provide similar protection to shareholders in 
corporations by requiring class votes to approve any alteration (or transaction) that 
would negatively affect or significantly alter the rights of a particular class of 
shares.179 
Consistent with constitutional design research, lower amendment thresholds 
will arguably support the endurance of organizational documents. But unlike 
drafters of constitutions and founders of nations, investors in a business perhaps do 
not have the same incentive to retain the organizational document itself. Exiting an 
equity position in a business entity is not revolutionary or particularly difficult; it is 
a relatively routine and anticipated occurrence in the business context. And unlike a 
new constitution, new business organizational documents can be easily created for 
the newly structured entity. In some instances, then, focus on the endurance of the 
document itself may be incomplete or illusory. 
Business entities may also incorporate flexibility into their ongoing operations, 
which allows the entity to endure in the face of exogenous shocks. Businesses can 
choose from a variety of mechanisms to increase flexibility in the relative allocation 
of power among the participants and in day-to-day management. The organizational 
documents of unincorporated entities often provide a list of specific matters the 
managers, members, or certain partners are individually or collectively authorized 
to handle in the ordinary course of business, followed by a list of matters that require 
the consent of at least a majority of the other owners.180 For example, an operating 
agreement might authorize the managing member to borrow money on behalf of the 
LLC, but require consent of a supermajority of the members to borrow an aggregate 
amount in excess of $50,000 in any quarterly period. 
                                                 
177 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency 
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 279 (1986) (“[C]ontractual mechanisms have evolved in 
response [to minority shareholders’ fears that those in control will favor themselves when 
distributing earnings]. These [mechanisms] include high voting and quorum requirements as 
well as employment and compensation agreements that make it difficult for those in control 
[of closely held corporations] to act without the consent of minority shareholders.”). 
178 See Michael Gentithes, The Tiered Article V, 34 WHITTIER L. REV. 307, 322 (2013) 
(“An amendment threshold set too low might release the hounds of majoritarian tyranny too 
readily, running roughshod over the rights of minorities previously thought to be 
fundamental or cementing a ruling coalition’s grip on the levers of power.”). 
179 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2015) (“The holders of the outstanding 
shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed amendment, whether or 
not entitled to vote thereon by the certificate of incorporation, if the amendment would 
increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of such class, increase or 
decrease the par value of the shares of such class, or alter or change the powers, preferences, 
or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect them adversely.”). 
180 Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 132, at 8–9 (discussing the managerial powers 
provided in statutes and the drafter’s task of customizing the document to reflect appropriate 
managerial controls for the particular entity). 
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Limiting the number and types of decisions that require consensus gives the 
individual owners the ability to more easily adjust to changes in the entity’s 
environment. An executive imbued with extraordinarily strong powers can respond 
rapidly to changing conditions. Conversely, rigidity in the day-to-day management 
operations makes it more difficult for a business to respond and adjust to unpredicted 
events.181 But naturally, such concentrated flexibility in authority carries the risk that 
the executive acts in a manner inconsistent with the preferences of even the vast 
majority of the organization’s stakeholders.182 Increased flexibility at the outset 
results in less control of what the business may look like in the future; the entity may 
operate much differently than it did when the agreement was formed.183 Regardless 
of how they decided to allocate control and economic sharing at the formation of the 
entity, the owners retain the ability to alter these fundamental choices as the entity 
undertakes its operations. 
Instead of incorporating flexibility in amending the organizational document or 
even in the operation of the business, perhaps a stronger analogy for endurance 
objectives can be made by evaluating the flexibility of the exit provisions for 
investors.184 Constitutional drafters seeking to create long-lived structures minimize 
the risk of document and nation failure by allowing amendments in response to 
changing incentives for the parties; they want parties to remain invested in the nation 
and in the constitution itself.185 In the business context, the members’ commitment 
to the business entity is perhaps more accurately reflected in the restrictions on 
transfer of ownership units and how they can otherwise exit the bargain. 
To be clear, promoting more enduring organizational documents is not to 
suggest that investors should be irrevocably committed to their business decisions. 
Mobility of capital is desirable, and investors need the ability to alter the allocation 
of their resources.186 But the ease with which capital can enter and exit private 
investments gives the money contributor (as opposed to the property or services 
contributor) more power, both in the negotiation process and when the company is 
faced with external shocks that threaten its operations. The relative mobility of cash 
capital gives that investor more bargaining power. To the extent that focusing on 
                                                 
181 Among the upsides to a rigid structure is increased predictability, as management’s 
range of options may be limited. See Gentithes, supra note 178, at 312. 
182 See J. William Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving the 
Limited Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97, 113 
(2000) (discussing how members in a manager-managed LLC “have relatively little control 
over the managers’ actions and little ability to assure that managers act for the members’ 
benefit rather than opportunistically.”). 
183 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
184 Cf. Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 132, at 9 (“Providing satisfactory means of 
exiting the LLC in the operating agreement is essential to preventing future conflicts among 
the members. In that regard, the drafter should address in the operating agreement the 
members’ right to transfer their membership interests and withdrawal of a member and 
consider including buyout provisions as well.”). 
185 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 81–82. 
186 Bordoff & Furman, supra note 105, at 342 n.54. 
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endurance is designed, at least in part, to remedy an imbalance of power among the 
investors, the level of flexibility included in the transfer restrictions of an interest in 
a business may provide protections to those investors with less liquid 
contributions.187 
For example, it is not uncommon for a private company to install a multilevel 
right of first refusal procedure for any owner wishing to transfer her ownership 
units.188 Such a provision might require the investor wishing to transfer units first to 
offer the units to the company and allow it thirty days to exercise the option. If the 
company declines the option, then the investor must offer the units to the other 
members on a pro rata basis and allow them thirty days to exercise their option. The 
option may even provide the ability for either the company or other members to pay 
the purchase price with a promissory note payable over a number of years. Under 
that scenario, it is fairly cumbersome for the investor to exit the business. To the 
extent that investors agree from the outset on this provision, provided of course that 
they understand its implications, the members can feel fairly confident of each 
other’s commitment to the entity and can feel secure that the business structure will 
endure. The amount of flexibility included in exit provisions can signal commitment 
to the company. 
Ultimately, the flexibility incorporated into the document is a matter of 
contractual bargain among the participants, and the amount of flexibility exists on a 
spectrum, just as constitutional flexibility exists on a spectrum.189 Businesses can 
include much flexibility in the procedures and votes required to amend the 
organizational documents and in the level of day-to-day control that managers have. 
Great flexibility in these areas allows the company the ability to adjust to any 
number of changes, both in the external environment and in the makeup and goals 
of the participants. But that flexibility also opens the possibility that the 
organization, although still existing in name and original documents, will look and 
function very differently from what was originally planned. On the other end of the 
spectrum is a document that is very rigid because it is not easy to amend, gives little 
control or flexibility for owners to deal with exogenous changes, or makes it difficult 
for individual investors to exit. That business will have more predictability and 
certainty in how it will operate down the road, but may have difficulty adjusting to 
changes along the way without reorganizing. 
                                                 
187 See Molitor, supra note 102, at 527 (advocating consideration of transfer restrictions 
to protect minority shareholders). 
188 Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 132, at 10 (“An alternative to requiring member 
consent to all transfers is to provide for a right of first refusal when a member desires to sell 
[their] interest in the LLC. The right of first refusal requires a member, before selling his or 
her interest, to offer the membership interest to the other members on the same terms as the 
member offers to sell to an outside party. This affords the remaining members the option to 
buy out the selling member rather than allowing admission of a new member with whom the 
remaining members may not want to associate. The right of first refusal provides a good 
balance of maintaining the exiting member’s right to liquidity of the membership interest 
and the remaining members’ right to decide with whom they want to be in business.”). 
189 See supra notes 170–173 and accompanying text. 
2015] ENDURING DESIGN FOR BUSINESS ENTITIES 991 
 
In each case, the impact of endurance will be different and it is up to the 
investors individually and as a group to decide on the strategy that is best for them 
and their business. The more often that drafting attorneys make the flexibility-
endurance-predictability analysis part of the decision-making conversation at the 
outset, the better it bodes for the health of the institution, whether in terms of 
longevity or other goals. Investors will be making a conscious decision on the 
desirability of both the longevity of the business and the resilience of the 
organizational document. 
 
2.  Inclusion 
 
The level of inclusion in the constitutional setting refers to how many different 
perspectives are represented in both drafting the document and the ongoing 
enforcement of the bargain.190 Formative-stage constitutional inclusion is 
manifested through involvement in the “writing, deliberation, and approval” process 
of the document,191 which consists primarily of deliberation by a publicly elected 
political body and ratification through public referendum.192 Thereafter, inclusion in 
ongoing constitutional enforcement is manifested through public election of political 
leaders, direct democracy initiatives, and direct public challenges of legislation on 
constitutional grounds.193 
Design and implementation processes that involve more stakeholders are 
believed to promote continued adherence to the agreement “by increasing the 
visibility of the document and demonstrating societal consent” and “by increasing 
the stake that citizens have in the document and their attachment to it.”194 People 
who are more aware of the contents of the document have both a greater allegiance 
to it and more respect for it as a governing instrument.195 Elkins and his colleagues 
posit a reciprocal connection between attachment of the people to the constitutional 
bargain and its ultimate survival: “framers and citizens will protect a document to 
which they are attached and documents that survive will in turn engender norms of 
                                                 
190 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78. 
191 Id. at 98. 
192 Id. 
193 In particular, to evaluate inclusivity both in the constitution making and in ongoing 
governance, ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, created an index of eight measures of inclusivity: 
“public referendum or publicly elective deliberated body; elected head of state; elected 
legislature; public can challenge constitutionality of legislation; citizen initiatives; citizen 
referenda; recall of legislators; and recall of the executive.” Id. at 99 n.3. 
194 Id. at 81. 
195 Id. at 78 (“Successful constitutions generate allegiance from those among later 
generations who do not initially consent to them, much less participate in the drafting of the 
texts.”); see also Kersch, supra note 140, at 1088 (arguing that much of the success of 
conservative political leaders in the U.S. is due in large part to that party’s use of 
constitutional political rhetoric to revitalize “the main lines of constitutional discussion in 
America”). 
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attachment.”196 In this way, inclusion in both the drafting and ongoing enforcement 
of a document “generate[s] the common knowledge and attachment essential for 
self-enforcement.”197 
A comparable approach to inclusion at the formation of a business enterprise 
would incorporate significant input from each of the primary equity holders, 
regardless of the form of their contributions. Obviously, all participants in a business 
enterprise actively choose whether to invest in the organization. This is in contrast 
to a nation-state where, even at the formative stages of the government, many who 
would have chosen not to be part of the constitutional bargain are nonetheless pulled 
within its authority by virtue of their residency. And although citizens do have the 
ability to relocate, there is a default position of constituency in some government. 
The default for the potential business investor is nonparticipation. 
Notwithstanding these distinctions, inclusion’s furtherance of longevity in the 
constitutional setting likewise suggests incorporating inclusion into the business 
organizational drafting context. To the extent business owners are motivated by 
endurance of the enterprise, it is critical that the owners’ commitment to participate 
was an informed decision. 
Further, endurance can be enhanced by meaningful continuous involvement by 
the participants. This is not meant to decry entities like traditional limited 
partnerships with whole classes of owners that do not participate in management. 
Instead, it suggests that the equity holders’ perception of the enterprise’s legitimacy, 
and accordingly its sustainability, are supported through structural means similar to 
participatory democracy. 
In the context of most small entities, participation in drafting or in ongoing 
operations is not terribly difficult; members can fairly easily get attention to make 
their opinions and preferences known.198 But the key to true inclusion, inclusion that 
results in an enduring organization, is that such participation must be informed. 
Thus, at both of those crucial points of time—the initial document creation and the 
ongoing enforcement of the bargain—the structure, content, and format of the 
organizational documents themselves can facilitate inclusion. Further, true and 
knowing inclusion of all stakeholders is promoted when the documents are in a 
usable format and when the content of the documents is visible and easily accessible. 
Very often, attorneys defer to the most business savvy or most communicative 
partner when outlining the entity structure.199 If the attorney represents only one 
                                                 
196 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78. 
197 Id. 
198 For an analysis of shareholder inclusion in the context of public corporations, 
compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006) (advocating for the efficiency benefits of the director 
primacy that limits shareholder voting rights), with Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, 
Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2071, 2112–20 (2010) (criticizing the theory of board primacy and suggesting an 
alternative theory that expands the corporate voting system by treating other corporate 
constituents (creditors, employees, consumers, etc.) like shareholders). 
199 Moore, supra note 108, at 678 (“The problem is most acute in closely held 
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investor, then indeed, the attorney’s role is to do just that—to promote provisions 
that place the individual client in the best position given her unique objectives. But 
if the attorney represents the organization (or multiple investors) in the formation 
process, then the attorney has an obligation to take a more balanced approach.200 A 
drafter concerned with the long-term viability of the document should carefully 
explain each of the key decision points in the agreement and ensure that even the 
least experienced participants understand the choices and their alternatives. 
This approach suggests using straightforward language and streamlining the 
agreement. Indeed, the more standardized the language is, the more easily 
translatable the agreement is, and the more easily it can be absorbed by a novice 
investor.201 Use of standardized language is not intended to suggest a reversion to 
fill-in-the-blank form documents, but rather to documents that use clear and 
consistent language and are accepted and widely adopted in a practice area, in a 
                                                 
corporations and small partnerships where . . . distinguishing between representation of the 
entity and its individual members is more difficult. This difficulty exists because, unlike the 
publicly held corporation, the ownership and management are substantially identical. As a 
result, even entities in which a single dominant shareholder does not exist, counsel ‘typically 
will have regular contact with [the owners] and may well have personal relationships with 
some or all of them, each of whom is likely to have a significant financial stake in the 
enterprise.’ In this context, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine who speaks on behalf 
of the entity. Rather, ‘counsel is more likely to find individual participants attempting to 
realize their personal goals through the enterprise.’ Because these individuals often have the 
legal authority to direct the affairs of the business, neither counsel nor the individuals are 
likely to distinguish between advising the entity and advising the individual constituents.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell, supra note 104, at 479)). 
200 Cf. Mitchell, supra note 104, at 477–79 (explaining that, “[c]ounsel to the close 
corporation may often find it difficult to determine who speaks for th[e] ‘entity’ the [Code 
of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct] insist she 
represents. She will particularly be stymied in making this determination when the 
distribution of ownership is relatively equal, for under such circumstances each shareholder 
will legitimately expect that the corporation will fulfill his individual interests.” (citation 
omitted)); Moore, supra note 108, at 679 (“[T]here is a presumption that entity lawyers 
represent only the entity itself and not the individuals unless the specific circumstances show 
otherwise. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what circumstances suffice to demonstrate 
individual representation in a particular case. According to the ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, ‘[w]hether such a relationship has been created 
almost always will depend on an analysis of the specific facts involved. The analysis may 
include such factors as whether the lawyer affirmatively assumed a duty of representation to 
the individual . . . , whether the [individual] was separately represented by other counsel 
when the [organization] was created or in connection with its affairs, whether the lawyer had 
represented an individual . . . before undertaking to represent the [entity], and whether there 
was evidence of reliance by the individual . . . on the lawyer as his or her separate counsel, 
or of the [individual’s] expectation of personal representation.’” (quoting ABA Comm’n on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991)). 
201 See Molitor, supra note 102, at 577–78 (advocating for standardized business 
organizational documents using plain English). 
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region, or at least within a law firm.202 An organizational document, like any legal 
contract, that is clear and usable will result in members who understand the nature 
of their investment, the risks and benefits they face, and the options they have as 
part of the entity.203 Investors will be more committed to the organization and to the 
document because, from the beginning, the specifics of the agreement will be more 
transparent and the choices they are making will be more informed. Parties to a 
business entity agreement will better understand the content of the document and 
how the choices during the formation process will impact them. 
In addition to a more informed decision to participate, clearly drafted 
organizational documents will result in more inclusion and commitment in the 
ongoing operations of the business. Investors who enter into an agreement informed 
about their commitment and the risks they face in the operation of the business will 
more fully respect the bargain. Even adverse consequences from a business decision 
will more likely be accepted as legitimate when investors were aware on the front 
end of the possible outcomes. They will be less likely to claim that they were not 
consulted in the document drafting or that one party was intentionally misleading. 
Inclusivity thereby deescalates otherwise potentially troubling situations and may in 
fact push the parties toward a compromise or at least an acquiescence as to the next 
steps for the business. 
From an even broader perspective, an inclusive drafting approach could 
incorporate input from non-equity holders. Clearly, the business entity’s ongoing 
relationships with lenders, bondholders, employees, regulators, and others outside 
of the organization itself will have a significant impact on its long-term viability.204 
Although these non-owner stakeholders will not necessarily have the power to 
dictate the terms of the document or to modify the agreement, soliciting input from 
them can nonetheless promote the long-term health of the organization. Involving 
outsiders in the structuring, planning, and drafting processes from the beginning can 
increase the visibility of the bargain, eliminate asymmetries of information, and 
identify uncertainties and vulnerabilities in the structure.205 The equity holders then 
                                                 
202 See infra part V.B. 
203 See Molitor, supra note 102, at 577–78. 
204 Davis, supra note 49, at 99 (“The value of a contract to the parties who adopt it may 
also depend on the extent to which third parties are uncertain about its effects. This is most 
likely to be the case if the parties to a contract value the ability to transfer interests in it to 
the third parties in question, either directly or indirectly.”); see also Michelle M. Harner, 
Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
541, 546, 580–94 (2010) (recognizing the value of the corporate monitoring function of 
activist shareholders, creditors, and debt holders in the corporate context, and suggesting that 
board decisions influenced by these stakeholders be treated in a manner similar to board 
transactions with interested directors to temper any self-interest concerns, rather than 
imposing special fiduciary duties on these parties). 
205 See Stefan J. Padfield, In Search of a Higher Standard: Rethinking Fiduciary Duties 
of Directors of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 79, 107–08 
(2004) (discussing the historical limitations of the board of directors’ legal duties to outsiders 
and the movement to “improve the extent to which stakeholder interests were protected, or 
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can take this input and incorporate it into their organizational documents in a way 
that can mitigate problems down the road by clarifying expectations, facilitating 
common knowledge, and garnering more investment in the bargain. 
However it is accomplished, it behooves drafting attorneys to create 
organizational documents with inclusion in mind as a way to increase the longevity 
of the organization and the commitment of its members. By clearly communicating 
options to investors on the front end and by soliciting input from non-owners, 
attorneys can employ organizational documents in a manner that facilitates informed 
participation and increased attachment to the business entity. 
 
3.  Specificity 
 
Specificity in constitutional drafting refers to both scope and detail.206 By 
scope, Elkins and his colleagues referred to the number of issues covered by a 
particular document “as a percentage of some ninety-two possible topics.”207 By 
detail, they referred to “precision and elaboration” of those topics, measured by 
calculating the average number of words on any given topic.208 
Although drafting for specificity takes time and political bargaining,209 
investing that effort upfront can alleviate the problems of hidden information and 
disparate expectations.210 Additionally, specificity can aid in enforcement by 
providing clear and detailed information about the underlying terms of the bargain 
as represented in the final document.211 
Although the U.S. Constitution is itself loosely drafted in a way that has 
facilitated its longevity,212 specificity can enhance endurance for three reasons. First, 
specificity prompts more thorough bargaining and negotiation at the outset by 
                                                 
at least considered, during times of dramatic corporate change.”). 
206 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 84, 103; see also Hirschl, supra note 16, at 1343 
(noting that “size and scope matter” in constitutional design). 
207 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 104. 
208 Id. at 103, 105. 
209 Id. at 84 (“Specificity requires careful drafting and hard bargaining, both of which 
take time and political resources.”). 
210 Id. at 68–72. 
211 Id. at 84 (“[T]he clarity and specificity of the constitutional contract may be helpful 
in providing an incentive for, and facilitating, enforcement. A clearer, more specified 
document will more easily generate shared understandings of what it entails.”). 
212 Id. (“There is a near-consensus among American constitutional scholars and 
advisors that a loosely drafted framework constitution is superior to a more specific one. The 
belief is that the U.S. constitution has endured precisely because it has not specified details, 
but left them instead to ordinary law and custom.”); Albert, supra note 126, at 406 (“[T]he 
United States Constitution is flexible, written in broad strokes, and outlines a basic structure 
of government, collective purpose, and citizen rights and responsibilities, with the 
preponderance of the details left to be added later by legislative, executive, judicial, and civic 
actors. This hints at a connection between constitutional flexibility and constitutional 
specificity that is worth pursuing. It may be best examined through the prism of constitutional 
change.”). 
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requiring parties to anticipate issues that may arise.213 Second, it is costly, and the 
greater upfront investment will prod constituents to work with the existing document 
as necessary rather than redrafting it completely.214 And third, “[s]pecificity 
incentivizes ongoing investments in the constitutional text” because parties will need 
to monitor the document to make sure the scope and details of issues it contains 
remains current and accurate.215 Thus, a constitution with greater depth and breadth 
of coverage can facilitate rather than impede endurance.216 
For the same reasons that specificity can help a constitution endure, specificity 
can add value to the drafting of an organizational agreement and its ongoing 
enforcement. Although few would suggest increasing the word count in most 
operating agreements, organizational contracts that plainly address more issues are 
likely to be more useful to the clients if—and this is a huge if—the clients understand 
the choices made on those issues as well as their alternatives. If the parties to the 
bargain understand the decision points, have input on those decision points, and give 
the drafting attorney guidance on how to address them in the agreement, the 
document will likely have staying power. Further, if the parties discuss issues 
specifically in the drafting process, but ultimately leave them out of the agreement, 
the document reflects still a more complete bargain because the omission is 
intentional and all parties are informed. 
Thus, addressing a larger number of organizational choices in more detail 
encourages participants to disclose information and expectations earlier in the 
process.217 These issues are likely more easily addressed in the drafting process than 
in the operating phase of the entity.218 Thus, organizational documents that address 
more issues in a clear and concise manner can facilitate the discussion of each of the 
decisions that must be made at the time the entity is established. 
As in constitutional drafting, more discussion and negotiation during the 
drafting stage of a business document, although time intensive and costly, can help 
                                                 
213 Id. at 86–87. 
214 “[S]pecificity of a written constitution represents a certain amount of sunk-cost 
investment that cannot be recouped should the constitution fail. The greater the investment 
in a particular constitutional bargain, the less willing parties will be to deviate from it by 
switching to a new bargain.” Id. at 87. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 88 (“A constitution covering more topics will tend to incentivize more interest 
groups toward enforcement, whereas depth helps them develop shared understandings of 
what the constitution requires and allows.”). 
217 Dent, supra note 76, at 308 (“Counsel must be able to anticipate future problems 
and fashion solutions to them. In so doing they must decide what issues can be left open until 
later and which should be resolved at the outset, which in turn raises questions of how 
important various questions are to the parties. Thus, counsel needs an understanding of what 
problems can arise for a particular firm as it grows and the special needs of its particular 
parties.”). 
218 See Molitor, supra note 102, at 495–96 (arguing that the best way to protect minority 
owners is at the organization formation stage rather than by litigation after an issue has 
arisen). 
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alleviate problems associated with hidden information and disparate expectations.219 
The number of different issues addressed by the organizational document can be a 
proxy for a more thorough bargaining process, which can bring to the table issues 
and expectations of the investors. Additionally, the added investment of time in 
creating the business organization encourages participants to commit to the 
document, as a product of their time and effort, and to the entity they themselves 
helped create. 
Specificity is not always, in either the constitutional drafting setting or the 
business context, a proxy for increased complexity of the document. Most 
organizational documents are indeed highly intricate and complex and include pages 
and pages of provisions governing numerous aspects of the business organization. 
But the benefits of specificity—of increased scope and detail of issues covered—are 
lost when clients are unable to understand the stakes of organizational decisions. 
Rote drafting and perfunctory reliance on precedent agreements can result in 
organizational documents that are extremely intricate, but not in a way that advances 
the specificity that institutional design scholars seek.220 Rather, specificity that 
promotes endurance must be housed in a document that is readable and usable. Only 
then will the entity and its investors reap the benefits of the depth of coverage in 
terms of fruitful negotiations at the outset, clearer understanding of the choices made 
in the document, and more informed participation in the entity’s ongoing operations. 
 
V.  INCORPORATING ENDURANCE INTO BUSINESS DRAFTING 
 
Recognizing the value that deliberate drafting can bring to the institutional 
bargaining process, this section imports the elements of enduring constitutional 
design into the business design context. Even if institutional longevity is not a 
prevailing motivation of the organizers, the process of structuring business entities 
and drafting their formative documents can be enriched by incorporating certain 
aspects of constitutional design that are associated with endurance. One benefit of 
this process indeed may be longer-lived organizational documents, but in many 
cases other benefits are more likely and prevalent. 
Fundamentally, both the constitutional bargain and the organization of a 
business enterprise involve previously autonomous parties subjecting themselves to 
a governing regime with the mutual goal of enhancing the welfare of the participants. 
In each case, the parties to the agreement are bargaining in an environment of 
asymmetrical information while facing many uncertain future events over which the 
entity and its stakeholders have limited control. A serious testing point for each 
arrangement is when a structural element incorporated at inception later provides an 
                                                 
219 See supra notes 206–211 and accompanying text. 
220 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis 
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 
265 (1985) (“More complex and finely calibrated instruments generally offer improved 
results. Unfortunately, intricate, special-purpose instruments may also invite disaster if put 
to unintended uses, or if the instruments themselves have been inadequately designed and 
tested.”). 
998 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
advantage to certain parties relative to other participants. Whether that advantage is 
construed as a trap, a calculated risk, or a negotiated concession depends in large 
part on transparency and thoroughness of the bargaining process. An open and 
detailed negotiation at the formative stage of government or business collaboration 
enhances the perceived legitimacy of the arrangement and increases the likelihood 
that the bargain will endure in the wake of potentially destabilizing developments. 
As outlined above, scholars have associated certain design elements with 
constitutional endurance, including inclusion, amendability, and specificity.221 
Integration of these components not only enables the institution to function in a 
variety of rapidly evolving environments, but also directs the discussion at formation 
in a manner that promotes resilient commitment of institutional participants. The 
following sections explore what inclusive, flexible, and specific organizational 
design and drafting might entail for business entities. 
 
A.  Form Documents with Alternative Provisions 
 
The attorney for the organizers of a business entity can approach formative 
stage investigation, guidance, and drafting in a manner that facilitates an inclusive 
bargaining and governance procedure. By utilizing a drafting process that 
encourages thoughtful discussion of the key provisions and important choices that 
the founders should make, attorneys can include all key parties in a meaningful 
dialogue about the document being crafted. 
In a largely document-driven practice setting, the forms employed by business 
counsel have a tendency to cabin the organizing discussions within the open or 
obviously deal-specific terms. For an LLC’s operating agreement, the vast majority 
of the preformation dialogue may address the members’ holding structures, 
contributions, sharing ratios, and perhaps the organizational purpose, as these terms 
seldom can be retained from a prior agreement. The attorney’s propensity to isolate 
and address the “blanks” in the operating agreement template seriatim is exacerbated 
by the use of precedent documents or forms that do not include alternative 
provisions. 
Instead of starting the negotiation and drafting process with a version of the 
operating agreement that has previously customized provisions, attorneys could craft 
form documents that instead identify the various alternative choices for key 
provisions.222 Evaluating each option and making a conscious selection will spur the 
attorney to consider the maximum number of alternatives and therefore to address 
those issues during the negotiation process with the participants of the entity. In that 
way, each founder and organizer of the enterprise begins the business relationship 
aware of the choices and the possibilities for the organization’s formation. 
                                                 
221 See supra Part IV. 
222 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 220, at 286 (suggesting that “[p]roviding a menu of 
instructions from which parties can choose greatly simplifies and reduces the cost of 
contracting[,]” and that “[p]reformulations[, or standardized terms,] bring to bear a collective 
wisdom and experience that parties are unable to generate individually.”). 
2015] ENDURING DESIGN FOR BUSINESS ENTITIES 999 
 
Clearly delineating the alternatives for key provisions and requiring 
participants to make deliberate choices reduces the biases associated with 
preexisting provisions and boilerplate language. It mitigates the status quo bias that 
drafting attorneys have toward choices made for prior agreements, and it encourages 
clients to discuss among themselves the benefits and risks of each option so that 
when problems arise later, the participants have made a conscious decision about 
how to handle the situation. 
For example, most simple LLC agreements will provide for allocations of 
income and losses according to sharing ratios, which in turn are usually tied to the 
agreed value of initial contributions. If the precedent document with which the 
attorney begins the drafting process includes such a provision, it is unlikely to be 
changed absent a specific request from the organizers.223 A drafter might consider 
giving the organizers more options when working from a form that includes 
alternative provisions for a preferred return to certain partners or for special 
allocations of income or loss items, along with appropriate modifications to account 
for tax consequences of such allocations. Taking this approach, attorneys and 
organizers alike can better appreciate the available options, rather than relying too 
readily on choices made in precedent documents. 
Further, instead of providing that distributions will simply be made in 
proportion to sharing ratios, the attorney might want to consider presenting the 
organizers with alternatives that incorporate drawing accounts or guaranteed 
payments to members contributing services regularly. Among the most contentious 
provisions for which options should be discussed are valuation of the member’s 
interest (e.g., as a going concern or with discounts for marketability or lack of 
control) and whether to incorporate rights of first refusal for member interests, and 
options to purchase a member’s interest at the termination of employment with the 
entity or the loss or suspension of a professional license. Merely selecting from 
among these provisions should at least encourage the drafter to consider whether 
less frequently used alternatives are appropriate or worth discussing among the 
organizers of a unique entity. Aside from spurring discussions among the clients, the 
attorney’s selection merely involves deleting the unused alternatives, adding only a 
few minutes to the drafting process. 
Encouraging discussion of the alternatives by facilitating methodical review of 
the choices in the document results in increased inclusion of the investors, but, more 
importantly, more informed and meaningful inclusion. If one of the members wants 
to transfer a portion of his interest one year after the organization of the LLC and 
only then discovers that the interest is subject to a right of first refusal in which the 
company or other members can purchase the interest on terms unfavorable to the 
transferring member, that member is likely to be frustrated and suspicious of the 
other members and the drafting attorney. If however, alternative structures were 
discussed and this method was perceived as a deliberate concession at the inception 
of the entity, then the member can anticipate these transfer restrictions and plan 
accordingly without the specter of deception or even lack of adequate disclosure. 
                                                 
223 See Miller, supra note 100, at 407. 
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Although a thorough review of the document without alternatives can alleviate these 
concerns to some degree, presenting each member with a range of choices gives 
even more credibility to the process and more informed commitment to the bargain. 
 
B.  Uniform Language in Private Agreements 
 
Although Part II.A. of this Article detailed the pitfalls of rote drafting and blind 
adherence to previously used contractual language, there is still significant value in 
promoting similar, if not uniform, language in private agreements.224 Indeed, a more 
standardized approach to drafting organizational documents like operating 
agreements and partnership agreements could facilitate a better informed and 
thorough bargaining process through each of the alternative provisions, making it 
more efficient to navigate the options for both the attorney and the client. Despite 
the similarities in structure and purpose of the documents employed to organize and 
govern unincorporated entities, the language of these documents varies widely 
among lawyers, law firms, and industries.225 For example, the following two 
provisions extracted from draft operating agreements establish largely similar 
conflicts of interest policies, but using different terminology: 
 
Transactions with Affiliates. Unless otherwise agreed in writing by all 
Members, each Member shall disclose any and all direct or indirect 
affiliation with or interest in any Person with which the Company proposes 
to do business or enter into any financial transactions. The Company may 
enter into agreements with one or more Members or Affiliates of a 
Member provided that any such agreement shall be at rates and terms at 
least as favorable to the Company as those available from unaffiliated 
parties.226 
 
Conflicts of Interest. Unless otherwise approved by all of the Members, 
any transaction between the Company and any Member shall be effected 
in a manner consistent with the manner in which the transaction would be 
effected between the Company and an independent third party bargaining 
at arm’s length. Prior to entering into any material transaction with the 
Company, the Member shall disclose the material terms of such 
transaction to all of the Members.227 
 
                                                 
224 See Patterson, supra note 48, at 327 (“[The cost-saving] advantage of standard 
contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple 
firms agree on a standard contract.”). 
225 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
226 Draft operating agreement, para 6.4 (u.d.) (unpublished operating agreement) (on 
file with the Utah Law Review). 
227 Draft operating agreement, para. 3.6(a) (u.d.) (unpublished operating agreement) (on 
file with the Utah Law Review). 
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These differences result in increased reading costs for participants.228 It would 
take a careful reading even for those with prior business experience to discern that, 
in each case, a member is allowed to do business with the company, an obvious 
conflict of interest, so long as the other members are aware of the conflict and the 
terms are objectively fair to the company. An even closer read might identify the 
slight differences between the provisions in applicability to affiliates of members 
and definitions of fairness. Thus, the language variations can obscure the underlying 
choices that were made in forming the organization.229 
Consistent language facilitates inclusion by making the review process more 
meaningful and encourages better discussion among the parties and attorneys.230 It 
reduces the burden on investors to determine their rights and obligations, and it 
highlights the bargaining points in the same way that state realtors association form 
documents streamline the negotiating points for common property acquisitions.231 
Thus, uniform provisions create and utilize terms of art such that the language 
conveys the underlying agreement immediately, which reduces asymmetry of 
information. Moreover, it accommodates faster and more cost-effective outside 
review by counsel to each of the individual members or by other interested parties. 
In this way the negotiation process becomes less insular, and more participants have 
the requisite commitment and attachment to the document and the organization.232 
Standardization also allows the document to be more specific and 
comprehensive in terms of the scope and detail of issues it covers.233 With less 
opaque language, the document can address more issues and address them more 
efficiently. Uniform language in turn allows for conversations and decisions 
covering more topics by enhancing participation in the negotiating process.234 
Bargaining becomes easier and less costly with language that is standardized, which 
                                                 
228 Davis, supra note 49, at 100 (“[T]he magnitude of reading costs . . . depends on how 
much the document and the associated contract deviate—in terms of both language and 
substance—from documents with which the reader is already familiar.”). 
229 Stein, supra note 68, at 66 (“By cutting away some of the less important verbiage, 
attorneys can help the parties (and potentially the courts) focus on the fundamentals and get 
them right.”). 
230 See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text. 
231 Davis, supra note 49, at 100–01 (“[T]he value of adopting a given contractual 
document will increase to the extent that it either is already familiar to potential readers or is 
expected to become familiar to such readers while it is in use. In other words, the value of a 
document will depend on how frequently it has been used in the past and how widely it will 
be used while in force.”). 
232 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra Part IV.B.3; see also Smith, supra note 52, at 1188 (“Boilerplate exploits 
modularity, and this modularity in turn allows for a greater degree of complexity and 
specialization than would be possible otherwise. . . . As artifacts—including contracts and 
other legal relations—become more complex, more specialization is called for—
specialization that modularity can support through its role in managing complexity.”). 
234 See Dent, supra note 76, at 311 (“One way to preserve trust is to avoid unusual and 
complex terms. The effects of novel terms are hard to predict; business people feel more 
comfortable with customary terms.”). 
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can accommodate increased specificity in the document. 
Other benefits flow from the use of similar provisions. Among the most 
significant benefits is consistency of interpretation by courts.235 Courts outside of a 
select few jurisdictions like New York, Delaware, or California are infrequently 
confronted with these types of organizational document interpretation issues.236 
States with a paucity of business law could easily look to these states for interpretive 
guidance if the language used in private agreements is similar. 
The idea is not to transform organizational attorneys into scriveners who merely 
engage in check-the-box practice. More standardized language is not meant to be 
unalterable. It merely serves as a starting point and highlights the differences 
between documents so readers can more readily identify the unique choices made in 
a particular structure. 
Even in a more uniform drafting setting, conscientious drafters still reap 
benefits. Although law firms can be proprietary in the content and style of their form 
documents, they can nonetheless retain their competitive advantage even with 
standardized language because it will allow them to better serve their clients and 
facilitate easier comparison of competing documents.237 
 
C.  Beyond Traditional Document Usage 
 
Finally, attorneys can maximize the effectiveness of business organizational 
documents by considering other uses of technology that can enhance the 
functionality of documents. Nearly all documents now exist electronically, and even 
the simplest word processing software has capacities far greater than those typically 
used by attorneys.238 Organizational document drafters have thus far been reluctant 
to take advantage of technological tools that have developed over the last decades, 
much less the last few years.239 Presently, a “modern” operating agreement is one 
                                                 
235 Goetz & Scott, supra note 220, at 301 (“An important goal of the drafter of any 
contractual formulation is to create a contract that a court will interpret in a predictable 
way.”). 
236 See Miller, supra note 100, at 351, 357 (noting that of survey respondents from 
Delaware, California, New York, and Pennsylvania, those from Delaware reported a higher 
level of experience with shareholder lawsuits). 
237 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 353 (“But for many contract terms—certainly 
maturely standardized terms . . . —the real premium arises from efficiency (achieving client 
objectives cheaply and swiftly) not drafting expertise designed to achieve substantively 
favorable or superior terms.” (citation omitted)); see also Patterson, supra note 48, at 333 
(“Multifirm contract standardization can provide . . . increased competition among firms, 
because a standard contract makes comparison among firms’ offerings easier.”). 
238 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 315 (discussing how attorneys typically create 
and store forms and precedent documents electronically). 
239 Id. at 370–71 (“As an example, before 1980, litigators ascertained whether judicial 
precedents were good law using printed books of case histories. When such information 
became digitized and accessible using office terminals, newly trained lawyers embraced the 
system and comfortably relied upon it while veteran lawyers expressed skepticism about 
whether the computer had it right. No well known stories of failure have appeared.”). 
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that allows for email notices or provides for telephonic meetings. 
Drafting attorneys could consider more dynamic document structures and 
features that would facilitate inclusion, specificity, and flexibility. Technological 
advances can allow attorneys to create documents that are more user-friendly to a 
wider audience of clients, facilitate deeper discussion of the key terms and their 
implications, and thus enhance the bargaining and drafting process. Organizational 
documents could contain links to spreadsheets where parties and attorneys can easily 
adjust ownership percentages, capital accounts, allocations of income or loss items, 
or other terms in the agreement. Modifying allocation percentages obviously carries 
the potential for significant tax consequences;240 so although a more modern 
operating agreement may facilitate the easy alteration of these provisions, it should 
also incorporate safeguards that identify potentially adverse impacts of changes and 
flag other provisions in the agreement that might need to be reconsidered or modified 
consistent with the change. 
Organizational documents could also easily include forms for required notices 
for meetings of the members or of a member’s intent to transfer a portion of her 
ownership, giving rise to a right of first refusal to other members and the company. 
These documents could simply be hyperlinked throughout the document where the 
notices are referenced or incorporated into the standard notification provision, along 
with email addresses.241 It would also be possible for these more dynamic documents 
to interface with other programs, such as a web-based email program that could 
provide calendar reminders for annual meetings or for required distributions (e.g., 
for estimated tax liability). 
Finally, one could rethink the look and layout of organizational documents. 
Particularly when standardized provisions are used, attorneys could easily provide 
summary or graphic tools that help explain the content of the underlying 
organizational document in a concise and readable fashion. Operating agreements 
tend to be dense and complex, often longer than law review articles, which is not to 
say that they are not good documents. They are fairly comprehensive, organized in 
a sensible manner, and address major deal points and most possible legal 
contingencies. But they are not very usable for the client or effective in 
communicating the rights and obligations of the parties. Further, documents could 
be designed to be more compatible for digital readers and for documents read on 
computers, again with the enhanced functionality and technical capabilities such as 
hyperlinks or incorporation of Excel sheets, graphs, and charts. 
                                                 
240 See LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOËL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER 
K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS 51 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing how 
allocations generally must either have substantial economic effect or be in accordance with 
the partner’s interest in the partnership or risk being reallocated in accordance with such 
interest as described in Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (2014)). 
241 Davis, supra note 49, at 103–04 (“For example, embedding XML codes in 
contractual documents can make it easy for individual terms to be searched for and linked to 
texts that explain their import, even as they are cut and pasted from one document to 
another.”). 
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All of these features speak to the document as a tool for the members of the 
organization, as opposed to merely a guide for attorneys to address conflicts after 
they have arisen or in preparation for litigation. More advanced documents can 
promote inclusion and specificity not only at the drafting phase but also in the 
ongoing operations of the organization. When it is easier for the clients to understand 
the nature of the agreement (tabular summary layout), to comply with their 
obligations (prepopulated notice forms connected to email programs), and to see the 
consequences of various actions (Excel sheets that easily display modifications to 
allocations and distributions), the bargaining and operating processes are inherently 
more inclusive and can be more flexible and more specific. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Design choices matter. Whether the institution is a constitution or a business 
structure, the elections reflected in the document and the process by which those 
elections were made can impact the likelihood of success of the enterprise. Knowing 
how design choices such as endurance affect certain aspects of institutional success 
allows organizers to make more informed and reliable decisions about how to 
structure their enterprises for themselves and for their investors. 
Organizational drafting for business entities is often an unmoored process, 
resulting in structures that fail to take into account unique objectives of founders. 
Business and transactional attorneys who embrace a more deliberate approach to 
entity design can provide more appropriate products for their clients. This Article 
suggests that business lawyers look to the lessons from constitutional design 
literature and the elements associated with enduring institutions—inclusion, 
flexibility, specificity—for guidance in developing more thorough bargaining and 
drafting processes. Even when a long-lived structure is not a paramount goal of the 
organizers, understanding how such design choices impact endurance and the 
bargain in general can help attorneys match the organizational structure to the 
founders’ goals. 
